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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA 
EASTERN/DUBUQUE DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AGRIPROCESSORS, INC., 
SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, 
BRENT BEEBE, 
HOSAM AMARA, 
ZEEV LEVI , and 
KARINA PILAR FREUND, 
Defendants. 
) No. CR 08-1324 LRR 
) 
) COUNT 1 
) 8 U.S. C. §§ 1324(a)(1 )(A)(v)(l) and 
j 1324(a)(1 )(B)(i): Conspiracy to Harbor 
) Undocumented Aliens for Profit 
) 
) COUNT 2 
) 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a}(1 )(A) (iii), 
) 1324(a)(1 )(A)(iv) , 1324(a)(1 )(A)(v)(ll) 
) and 1324(a)(1 )(B)(i): Harboring and 
) Aiding and Abetting the Harboring of 
) Undocumented Aliens for Profit 
) 
) COUNT 3 
) 18 U.S.C. § 371 : Conspiracy to 
) Commit Document Fraud 
) 
) COUNT 4 
) 18U.S.C. §§ 1546(a) and 2: Aiding 
) ano Abetting Document Fraud 
) 
) COUNIS 5-10 
) 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A(a)(1) and 2: 
) Aiding and Abetting Aggravated 
) Identity Theft 
) 
) COUNTS 11-12 
) 18 U.S.C. § 1344: Bank Fraud 
SECOND SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT 
1 
PReSENTED IN OPEN COURT 
BY THE 
FOREMAN OF THE GRAND JURY 
IN THE PRESENCE OF THE 
GRAND JURY 
And fil.ed \\\20IO'b r- n" 
ROBERT L PHELPS r 1 
COUNT 1 
(Conspiracy to Harbor Undocumented Aliens) 
(Agriprocessors, Inc., Sholom Rubashkin, Brent Beebe, 
Hosam Amara, Zeev Levi, and Karina Pilar Freund) 
Beginning on an unknown date and continuing to at least May 2008, in the 
Northern District of Iowa and elsewhere, defendants AGRIPROCESSORS, INC., 
SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, BRENT BEEBE, HOSAM AMARA, ZEEV LEVI, KARINA 
PILAR FREUND, and others known and unknown to the grand jury, did knowingly and 
willfully combine, conspire, and agree to commit the following offenses for the purpose 
of commercial advantage and private financial gain: 
(1) harbor one or more aliens at Agriprocessors, Inc.'s facility in Postville, 
Iowa, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that such aliens had 
come to, entered and remained in the United States in violation of law, in 
violation of Title 8, United States Code, Sections 1324(a)(1 )(A)(iii); and 
(2) encourage and induce one or more aliens to reside in the United States, 
knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that such residence was in 
violation of law, in violation of Title 8, United States Code, Sections 
1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). 
This was in violation of Title 8, United States Code, Sections 1324(a)(1 )(A)(v)(l) 
and 1324(a)(1 )(B)(i). 
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COUNT2 
(Harboring Undocumented Aliens) 
(Agriprocessors, Inc., Sholom Rubashkin, Brent Beebe, 
Hosam Amara, Zeev Levi, and Karina Pilar Freund) 
Beginning on an unknown date and continuing to at least May 2008, in the 
Northern District of Iowa and elsewhere, defendants AGRIPROCESSORS, INC., 
SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, BRENT BEEBE, HOSAM AMARA, ZEEV LEVI, and KARINA 
PILAR FREUND did, for the purpose of commercial advantage and private financial 
gain: 
(1) harbor, and aid and abet the harboring of, one or more aliens at 
Agriprocessors, Inc.'s facility in Postville, Iowa, knowing and in reckless 
disregard of the fact that such aliens had come to, entered and remained 
in the United States in violation of law; and 
(2) encourage and induce, and aid and abet the encouragement and 
inducement of, one or more aliens to reside in the United States, knowing 
and in reckless disregard of the fact that such residence was in violation of 
law. 
This was in violation of Title 8, United States Code, Sections 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), 
1324(a)(1 )(A)(iv), 1324(a)(1 )(A)(v)(ll) and 1324(a)(1 )(B)(i). 
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COUNT3 
(Conspiracy to Commit Document Fraud) 
(Agriprocessors, Inc., Shalom Rubashkin, Brent Beebe, 
Hosam Amara, and Zeev Levi) 
In about April and May 2008, in the Northern District of Iowa and elsewhere, 
defendants AGRIPROCESSORS, INC., SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, BRENT BEEBE, 
HOSAM AMARA, ZEEV LEVI, and others known and unknown to the grand jury, did 
knowingly and willfully combine, conspire, and agree to use, possess, obtain, accept 
and receive documents prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence 
of authorized stay and employment in the United States, that is, resident alien cards, 
knowing such cards to have been forged, counterfeited, altered, falsely made, procured 
by means of any false claim or statement, and to have been otherwise procured by 
fraud or unlawfully obtained, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). 
In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the object of the conspiracy, the 
following overt acts, among others, were committed in the Northern District of Iowa and 
elsewhere: 
(1) In about late April and early May 2008, defendants and Agriprocessors 
poultry managers HOSAM AMARA and ZEEV LEVI each told coconspirator and poultry 
supervisor Martin De La Rosa that several of the employees under his supervision were 
to be terminated because they were known to be working under bad employment 
documents. After several discussions, defendants AMARA and LEVI identified 
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approximately six such employees who they would allow to continue working at 
Agriprocessors if they obtained new documents. Defendant LEVI told De La Rosa to 
instruct the employee~ to obtain new documents as soon as possible. 
(2) Shortly afterward, De La Rosa told a coconspirator and poultry leadperson 
(herein after "poultry leadperson") to obtain new documents as soon as possible and to 
tell the other five employees to do the same. As directed, the six employees each 
obtained fake social security cards and resident alien cards and caused the documents 
to be delivered to De La Rosa. 
(3) Thereafter, De La Rosa gave the six employees' new fake documents to 
defendant LEVI, and defendant LEVI took the documents to Agriprocessors' Human 
Resources department. Defendant LEVI returned from the Human Resources 
department and told De La Rosa that there was a problem with the cards. Defendant 
LEVI gave the documents back to De La Rosa. 
(4) Thereafter, De La Rosa returned the documents to the poultry leadperson 
so that the poultry leadperson could attempt to have them corrected by the seller. The 
poultry leadperson was not able to have the documents corrected and returned the 
documents to De La Rosa and defendant LEVI. 
(5) Defendant LEVI took the documents to the Human Resources department 
again. Defendant LEVI returned and told De La Rosa the documents were no longer 
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needed, and the employees could continue working at Agriprocessors. LEVI gave the 
documents back De La Rosa who caused them to be returned to the employees. 
(6) On or about May 8, 2008, defendant and Agriprocessors operations 
manager BRENT BEEBE met with coconspirator and Agriprocessors beef department 
supervisor Juan Carlos Guerrero-Espinoza to discuss employees in Guerrero-
Espinoza's department who were known to be working under bad employment 
documents. Defendant BEEBE told Guerrero-Espinoza to meet with the employees and 
determine how to help them. 
(7) Later that day, Guerrero-Espinoza met with several of the employees in 
his department including a coconspirator and beef lead person (hereinafter "beef 
lead person"). Guerrero-Espinoza told the employees that, in order to continue working 
at Agriprocessors, they would have to get new identification documents in new names. 
(8) During the same meeting, the beef leadperson told the others that he 
could obtain the new documents for the employees but that it would cost each 
employee $300. The beef leadperson later spoke to his fake document source and the 
cost was changed to $200 due to the volume. 
(9) After the meeting with the employees, Guerrero-Espinoza met with 
defendant BEEBE and reported that the employees needed help with money an~ the 
total cost to help the employees would be approximately $4,500. Defendant BEEBE 
and Guerrero-Espinoza discussed trying to obtain a loan for the employees. 
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(1 0) Later that even.ing, defendant BEEBE took Guerrero-Espinoza to meet 
with defendant and Agriprocessors vice president and chief executive officer SHOLOM 
RUBASHKIN near the barn area at Agriprocessors. Defendant RUBASHKIN, defendant 
BEEBE, and Guerrero-Espinoza discussed the employees in Guerrero-Espinoza's 
department needing $4,500 in loans. 
(11) On or about May 9, 2008, defendant BEEBE and defendant RUBASHKIN 
called Guerrero-Espinoza to a meeting in the area of defendant RUBASHKIN's office at 
Agriprocessors. Defendant RUBASHKIN, defendant BEEBE, and Guerrero-Espinoza 
again discussed the employees' need for $4,500 in loans. Defendant RUBASHKIN 
agreed to loan the money. Defendant RUBASHKIN also suggested defendant BEEBE 
and Guerrero-Espinoza provide similar assistance to other employees from other 
departments at Agriprocessors. 
(12) Later on or about May 9, 2008, defendant BEEBE delivered $4,500 in 
cash to Guerrero-Espinoza to be used for loans to the employees. 
(13) Later on or about May 9, 2008, Guerrero-Espinoza met with the beef 
leadperson and several Agriprocessors employees in the offices of the beef department. 
The employees provided money, photographs, fake names and dates of birth to the 
beef lead person. Guerrero-Espinoza loaned a portion of the $4,500 he had received 
from defendant BEEBE to some of the employees from Guerrero-Espinoza's 
department. 
(14) On or about May 9, 2008, defendant RUBASHKIN asked coconspirator 
and Agriprocessors Human Resources department employee Laura Althouse to come 
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to work on May 11, 2008, to process new application paperwork for several people. 
Althouse agreed. 
(15) On or about May 10 and 11, 2008, the beef leadperson obtained new fake 
social security cards and fake resident alien cards for the Agriprocessors employees 
under Guerrero-Espinoza's supervision and many other Agriprocessors employees. 
(16) On or about May 11, 2008, defendant BEEBE directed Guerrero-Espinoza 
to stop the beef kill approximately one hour earlier than usual. 
(17) That afternoon, the beef leadperson returned to Agriprocessors with the 
new fake social security cards and fake resident alien cards. Guerrero-Espinoza and 
the beef leadperson passed out the new cards to the employees in the offices of the 
beef department. 
(18) Also on or about May 11, 2008, after obtaining their new fake cards, an 
initial group of employees went to the Human Resources department. There, they met 
with defendant RUBASHKIN, defendant BEEBE and Althouse. Defendant RUBASHKIN 
inspected several of the new fake resident alien cards. Defendant BEEBE and Althouse 
assisted the employees in completing new application paperwork using the names and 
information on the fake resident alien cards. Guerrero-Espinoza arrived and assisted in 
the process. 
This was in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371. 
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COUNT4 
(Aiding and Abetting Document Fraud) 
(Agriprocessors, Inc., Sholom Rubashkin, Brent Beebe, 
Hosam Amara, and Zeev Levi) 
In about April and May 2008, in the Northern District of .Iowa, defendants 
AGRIPROCESSORS, INC., SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, BRENT BEEBE, HOSAM AMARA, 
and ZEEV LEVI aided and abetted Agriprocessors employees who did knowingly use, 
possess, obtain, accept, and receive resident alien cards. Defendants 
AGRIPROCESSORS, INC., SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, BRENT BEEBE, HOSAM AMARA, 
and ZEEV LEVI then and there well knew the resident alien cards to have been forged, 
counterfeited, altered, falsely made, procured by means of a false claim or statement, 
and to have been otherwise procured by fraud or unlawfully obtained. Resident alien 
cards ate documents prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of 
authorized stay and employment in the United States. 
This was in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1546(a) and 
Section 2. 
COUNT 5-10 
(Aiding and Abetting Aggravated Identity Theft) 
(Agriprocessors, Inc., Sholom Rubashkin, and Brent Beebe) 
In about May 2008, in the Northern District of Iowa, defendants 
AGRIPROCESSORS, INC., SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, and BRENT BEEBE, during and in 
relation to the offenses set out in Counts 1, 2 and 4 above, did knowingly aid and abet 
the transfer, possession, and use of, without lawful authority, means of identification of 
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other persons. Specifically, defendants aided and abetted the transfer, possession and 
use of resident alien numbers which were then assigned to other persons. The resident 
alien numbers, identified by their last three digits and the names associated therewith, 
were as follows: 
CountS 645 (Ronald Sombra document) 
CountS 458 (Yesmi Loera document) 
Count7 790 (Lester Lopez document) 
CountS 373 (Reynaldo Lopez Nunez document) 
Count9 565 (Monica Hernandez document) 
Count 10 598 (Lera Chernova document) 
This was in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028A(a)(1) and 
Section 2. 
Introduction 
COUNTS 11 and 12 
(Bank Fraud) 
(Agriprocessors, Inc. and Sholom Rubashkin) 
On or about September 23, 1999, defendant AGRIPROCESSORS, INC. 
(hereinafter "AGRIPROCESSORS") entered into a loan agreement with FirSt Bank 
Business Capital, Inc. (FBBC), formerly known as FB Commercial Finance Inc. FBBC 
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is a subsidiary of First Bank, which is a financial institution whose deposits are insured 
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. FBBC receives its funding from First 
Bank. The original loan agreement was modified and amended. Under the most recent 
version, the agreement allowed defendant AGRIPROCESSORS to borrow up to a 
maximum of $35,000,000. At all times relevant to Counts 11 and 12 of this Indictment, 
the actual amount of credit depended upon the amount of qualifying collateral defendant 
AGRIPROCESSORS had available at any given time. The allowable balance to be 
borrowed on the revolving loan was computed using a borrowing base formula which 
included 85% of accounts receivable and 50% of inventory on hand. Throughout 2008, 
defendant AGRIPROCESSORS consistently maintained a balance owed on this line of 
credit in excess of $32,000,000. 
Under the loan agreement, customer payments on accounts receivable 
constituted part of FBBC's collateral for the revolving loan. Accordingly, the loan 
agreement established a mandatory procedure for the immediate transfer of customer 
payments to FBBC. The loan agreement required defendant AGRIPROCESSORS to 
deposit in a depository account all collections on customer accounts immediately upon 
receipt thereof and in the form received. Until such payments were so deposited or 
otherwise delivered to FBBC, the payments were to be held in trust by defendant 
AGRIPROCESSORS for and as the property of FBBC. At all times relevant to Counts 
11 and 12 of this Indictment, a depository account was established at Decorah Bank 
and Trust Company (the depository account) for the purpose of receiving such 
payments. 
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The loan agreement included certain representations and warranties on behalf of 
defendant AGRIPROCESSORS. Among them, defendant AGRIPROCESSORS 
represented and warranted that it was not in violation of any law, statute, or regulation 
applicable to defendant AGRIPROCESSORS, which violation would in any respect 
materially and adversely affect the collateral or defendant AGRIPROCESSORS' 
property, business, operations or condition (financial or otherwise). Each time 
defendant AGRIPROCESSORS requested an advance of funds on the revolving loan, 
an officer was required to certify that defendant AGRIPROCESSORS' representations 
and warranties in the loan agreement were true as of the date of the request. In 
addition, each time defendant AGRIPROCESSORS requested an advance on the 
revolving loan, an officer was required to certify the amount of available collateral. 
At all times relevant to Counts 11 and 12 of this Indictment, defendant SHOLOM 
RUBASHKIN was a vice president of defendant AGRIPROCESSORS and exercised 
day to day control over its finances. 
Defendant AGRIPROCESSORS requested an advance on the revolving loan 
nearly every business day during the life of the revolving loan. 
The Scheme to Defraud 
Beginning on a date unknown to the grand jury and continuing through about 
October 2008, in the Northern District of Iowa and elsewhere, defendants 
AGRIPROCESSORS and SHOLOM RUBASHKIN knowingly executed, and attempted 
to execute, a scheme to obtain funds under the control of First Bank and FBBC by 
means of fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises. 
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It was part of the scheme that defendant RUBASHKIN caused false certifications 
to be sent to FBBC on behalf of defendant AGRIPROCESSORS regarding defendant 
AGRIPROCESSORS' compliance with laws and regulations. Defendant RUBASHKIN 
certified defendant AGRIPROCESSORS' compliance with laws and regulations even 
though, as defendant RUBASHKIN well knew, defendant AGRIPROCESSORS was 
knowingly harboring undocumented aliens. 
It was also part of the scheme to defraud that defendant RUBASHKIN, on behalf 
of defendant AGRIPROCESSORS, and contrary to the terms of the loan agreement, 
diverted customer payments on accounts receivable. Defendant RUBASHKIN then hid 
from FBBC the fact that the customer payments had been received by, among other 
things, causing defendant AGRIPROCESSORS' books to inaccurately reflect that no 
such payments had been received. By doing this, defendant RUBASHKIN caused 
defendant AGRIPROCESSORS' books to inaccurately reflect that customers owed 
inflated amounts of money on their accounts. As a result, defendant RUBASHKIN 
caused false certifications to ·be sent to FBBC on behalf of defendant 
AGRIPROCESSORS regarding the amount of defendant AGRIPROCESSORS' 
accounts receivable. Eventually, and in order to hide this portion of the scheme, 
defendant RUBASHKIN caused checks of AGRIPROCESSORS and third party entities 
he controlled to be drafted payable to defendant AGRIPROCESSORS and then 
presented to FBBC in such a way that they fraudulently appeared to be from a customer 
of defendant AGRIPROCESSORS. 
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The Execution of the Scheme to Defraud 
On or about the dates set forth below, defendants SHOLOM RUBASHKIN and 
AGRIPROCESSORS, in execution and in furtherance of the scheme to obtain money 
and funds owned by and under the custody and control of First Bank and FBBC, 
knowingly caused the execution of the scheme as follows: 
Count 11 
On or about February 29, 2008, defendant SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, on behalf of 
defendant AGRIPROCESSORS, falsely certified to FBBC that defendant 
AGRIPROCESSORS' representations and warranties stated in the loan agreement 
were true as of that date. In fact," as defendant RUBASHKIN then knew, the 
representations and warranties were not true as of that date because defendant 
AGRIPROCESSORS was knowingly employing hundreds of illegal workers in violation 
of law and regulations. 
Count12 
In about September 2008, without FBBC's knowledge, defendant 
AGRIPROCESSORS received customer payments from its customer, C. M.P., in an 
account other than the depository account. Defendant SHOLOM RUBASHKIN, on 
behalf of defendant AGRIPROCESSORS, delayed the deposit of those customer 
payments into the depository account. During the period of delay, defendant 
AGRIPROCESSORS used the money for its own benefit. Defendant RUBASHKIN, on 
behalf of defendant AGRIPROCESSORS, caused defendant AGRIPROCESSORS' 
books to inaccurately reflect that such payments had not been received, and caused 
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false certifications to be sent to FBBC which inaccurately stateq the inflated amount of 
defendant AGRIPROCESSORS' accounts receivable. 
This was in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344. 
A TRUE BILL 
Is! Foreperson 
FOREPERSON 
l ~ {2_'--l l on 
Date 
· MA IT M. DUMMERMUTH 
United .J0'""'-'V 
By: 
PETER E. DEEGAN , 
Assistant United States Attorney 
~J"~ 
Assistant United States Attorney 
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STATE OF IOWA 1 
1 ss: AFFIDAVIT 
COUNTY OF LINN 1 
I, David M. Hoagland, being duly sworn, depose and state: 
TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE OF THE AFFIANT 
1. I, David M. Hoagland, make this affidavit in support of a search warrant of 
the premises of Agriprocessors, Incorporated, Postville, Iowa (hereinafter 
uAgriprocessors"). I am a Senior Special Agent with the United States 
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement ("ICE"), Office of Investigations in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. I 
have been employed with this agency since July 1991. ICE agents are 
authorized to investigate violations of offenses found in Title 8, Title 18, 
and Title 19 (Customs) of the United States Code. 
INTRODUCTION 
2. As a normal procedure of hiring employees in the United States, an 
employer must ascertain whether a potential employee is a United States 
citizen or lawfully present in the United States. As part of that hiring 
process, the employer is required to have the applicant for employment 
provide certain prescribed documents. These documents could include a 
United States passport, a birth certificate, a social security card, a Form 1-
551 (sometimes referred to as a Permanent Resident Alien card or "green 
card"), and various other proscribed documents. The employee initially 
fills out the first section of an immigration Form 1-9 and indicates in the 
appropriate blocks whether they are a citizen or national of the United 
States eligible for employment, a lawful permanent resident, or a foreign 
national with authorization for employment in the United States. With 
regard to the last two options, the employee also must provide an 
immigration "A" number issued by the Department of Homeland Security. 
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The employee then signs that portion of the form. The employer must 
complete the second portion of the form based upon the document(s) 
provided by the applicant for employment and indicate the type of 
document(s) and any number (e.g., social security number) associated 
with it. Additionally, the employer certifies that the employer has reviewed 
the document(s) presented and the employer believes the applicant is 
eligible for employment in the United States. The employer is required to 
sign this portion of the form. In section 3 of the form, employers must 
periodically re-certify that the applicant continues to be eligible for 
employment. The employer must maintain the original l-9 and must 
produce it upon request of the Department of Homeland Security. 
Employers are required to retain 1-9 forms for three years after the date of 
hire or for one year after employment is terminated, whichever is later. It 
is a common practice for employers to attach to an l-9 form photocopies 
of any documents produced by the employee in support of statements 
made on the 1-9 form. 
3. I am aware of the information set forth below through personal 
investigation, review of investigative reports, review of Social Security 
Administration ("SSA") documents, review of Iowa Workforce 
Development ("IWD") records, review of other public documents, 
discussions with IWD personnel, and discussions with other law 
enforcement officers. IWD is a State of Iowa government agency that 
works in conjunction with the Iowa Department of Labor and is a 
repository of documents for employees working in the state of Iowa. 
4. Over at least the last two years, ICE has received information concerning 
immigration offenses at and by employees of Agriprocessors, including 
allegations of harboring illegal aliens in violation of Title 8, United States 
Code, Sections 1324( a)( 1 )(A)(iii), 1324( a)( 1 )(A)(iv), 1324( a)( 1 )(A)(v)(ll), 
and 1324(a)(1 )(B)(I); engaging in a pattern or practice of hiring and 
continuing to employ. undocumented aliens in violation of Title 8, United 
States Code, Sections 1324a(a)(1)(A), 1324a(A)(2), and 1324a(f)(1); 
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document fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1546; 
misuse of social security numbers in violation of Title 42, United States 
Code, Section 408(a)(7)(B); and aggravated identity theft in violation of 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028A(a)(1). This Affidavit sets 
forth some, but not all, of the information ICE and other law enforcement 
officers possess concerning potential violations of the above-referenced 
statutes and potentially other criminal laws, but rather, is a summary of 
evidence in ICE's possession sufficient to establish probable cause to 
support this search warrant. 
5. This criminal search warrant is sought simultaneously with an application 
for a so-called Blackies warrant1 and in connection with the issuance of 
697 criminal complaints and arrest warrants against persons believed to 
be current employees of Agriprocessors for which the court determined 
there was probable cause to believe those people violated federal criminal 
laws. Of the approximately 697 charged by complaint, the government 
currently possessed copies of photo identification for only about 15 
individuals. Based upon the entire investigation to date, it is believed the 
photo identification cards depict the actual person who has possessed 
and used the identification. These photos will assist in identifying persons 
using the name on the photo identification. However, for the vast majority 
of subjects, the government does not possess photo identification using 
the alias name on the complaint and warrant. It will be necessary to 
attempt to identify, among those present at the facility during the search, 
those individuals for whom there are currently arrest warrants. Further, 
based on the information developed in the criminal investigation, there is 
reason to believe there will be other employees present at the 
Agriprocessors facility whose lawful authority to reside and work in the 
United States is unknown, or who lack such authority. Accordingly, in 
conjunction with the execution of this criminal search warrant, ICE intends 
A "Blackie 's warrant" is so-named because of the case ofBlackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 
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to question any alien or person found on the Agriprocessors property 
believed to be an alien as to his or her right to be or remain in the United 
States (8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1 ), for purposes of determining whether the 
alien should be administratively processed for removal from the United 
States. 
AGRIPROCESSORS 
6. Agriprocessors is a large multi-building meat processing complex located 
at 220 West Street (also known as 220 North West Street), Postville, Iowa 
52162. Agriprocessors opened in Postville in 1987 and now includes 
most of the land and buildings in the area formerly occupied by Iowa 
Turkey Products, Incorporated. The company is owned and operated by 
the Rubashkin family, one member of which, Sholom Rubashkin, is the 
Vice-President. 
7. Agriprocessors is in the business of slaughtering and processing of 
kosher and non-kosher meat products. In its advertising, Agriprocessors 
claims to be the largest kosher slaughterhouse in the nation. 
Agriprocessors processes beef, poultry, chicken, veal, lamb, and turkey. 
8. Agriprocessors' facility in Postville consists of an approximately 60-acre 
site on which there are many buildings. The facility is divided by railroad 
tracks, with the majority of the buildings located on the north side of the 
tracks. On the south side of the tracks, Agriprocessors has several 
buildings devoted to turkey production. Both portions of the facility are 
surrounded by a wire fence with multiple gates. Also on the property are 
administrative buildings located on the east side of the north portion of the 
property. All known areas of meat processing are located in the buildings 
within the areas labeled A and B as outlined on Exhibit 1, an aerial 
photograph of the Agriprocessors facility attached to this Affidavit. The 
building within area C is an administration building. The land area labeled 
A and C is owned by Agriprocessors. The land area labeled B is owned 
F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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by Nevel West Estates, Inc. (a/kla Nevel Properties, Inc.), whose 
registered agent is Shalom Rubashkin (Vice-President of Agriprocessors). 
On the south side of the railroad tracks, the land areas labeled A and B 
meet, are contiguous with no barrier between them, and form part of the 
same operating facility at Agriprocessors. Each of the approximate areas 
depicted as A and B on Exhibit 1 are surrounded by a chain link fence. 
9. Statistics retrieved from the Internet (www.agriprocessors.com) reveals an 
estimated 800 employees working at Agriprocessors. Information 
received from IWD reveal an estimated average of 900 employees 
working at the plant. 
10. Based on information from Source #7, set out below in more detail, 
Agriprocessors provides most of its employees with identification cards, 
also called electronic swipe or proximity cards, used for identifying 
employees. These cards are required for access to the Agriprocessors 
plant and allow access by employees to certain portions of the facility. 
These cards also appear to serve the function of a time card, recording 
when an employee clocks in and out of work. The swipe cards have the 
name of the employee affixed on the back of the card. Further details 
about this system are set out in subsequent paragraphs. · 
11 . Based on information from Source #7 (who is further identified in the 
Source Information below), Agriprocessors pays most of its employees by 
checks that are computer generated. A copy of a letter sent to an 
employee in May of 2007 concerning the fact that the employee's social 
security number did not match his/her name appears to be generated on 
a computer, using a word processor. Within the last two years, ICE 
agents have been present numerous times in the Agriprocessors 
administrative building while obtaining 1-9 forms relating to employees of 
Agriprocessors and have observed computers in the office. Therefore, it 
is believed Agriprocessors uses computers in its business and does so 
specifically with regard to employment documents. When conducting 
criminal investigations of aliens employed at Agriprocessors during the 
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past several years, ICE Special Agents have observed the Human 
Resources Manager retrieve the original 1-9 forms from a binder in the 
Human Resources Manager's desk. The same Human Resources 
Manager has been employed at Agriprocessors for several years, and 
remains in the same position as of the date of this application. 
12. Based on information from Source #7, Agriprocessors also maintains a 
biometric identification system for most of its employees. The system 
works by having each employee place their hand on a device that "reads" 
biometric data from the hand. This appears to identify the employee and 
also serve as a time clock. On April 25, 2008, Source #7 reported that 
s/he was able to note the make and model of the biometric scanner used 
by employees at Agriprocessors. The manufacturer of the scanner is 
Ingersoll Rand, and the model was Hand Punch 4000. An Ingersoll Rand 
product brochure for the Hand Punch 4000 states that the system "uses 
the size and shape of your employee's hand to verify their identity each 
time they punch. No fingerprints or palm prints are utilized" . . . "The 
terminal is fast and easy for anyone to use. Any employee's identity is 
verified in less than one second." The brochure indicates that the system 
also can track employee schedules, hours worked, and other information. 
The system has a reported capacity of up to 3,498 users and can be 
used in conjunction with a proximity or magnetic swipe card. An Internet 
search of Ingersoll Rand's website resulted in a further description of the 
device as a Hand Punch Biometric Time and Attendance Terminal Model 
4000. Further details about this system are set out in subsequent 
paragraphs. 
13. Based on information from Source #7, employees are provided with 
lockers or individual storage areas ("cubby holes") for storing personal 
items, including in some cases wallets and other items that may contain 
identification information. Most employees are also required to carry on 
their person the identification card issued by Agriprocessors and may also 
carry other forms of identification. 
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14. Employees are issued pay checks at the Agriprocessors facility. The pay 
checks have a detachable pay stub which contains pay and identity 
information. In some cases (more fully explained below) these checks 
may be issued in names other than the true name of the employee or the 
name under which the employee is working at Agriprocessors. The 
checks also exhibit the Social Security number under which the 
employees are working. Based on the observations of Source #7, who 
has seen other employees with checks while at the Agriprocessors facility, 
some employees may have these pay checks or pay stubs on their 
persons. 
FORMER SUPERVISOR 
Source #1 
15. ICE Special Agents interviewed Source #1 on November 6, 2007, in 
reference to information originally provided to DHSIICE in January 2006, 
that an Agriprocessors Human Resources Manager was hiring numerous 
illegal workers. Source #1 said s/he was a former employee of 
Agriprocessors and had worked there as a supervisor from approximately 
2005 until approximately 2006. Source #1 stated that Agriprocessors 
employed approximately 3,000 workers at the plant, farms, and other 
businesses and property. 
16. Source #1 stated that nationals of Mexico, Guatemala, and Eastern 
Europe were under the Source's supervision, and the Source estimated 
80% of these employees were illegally present in the United States. 
Source #1 stated there was an incident at Agriprocessors where Source 
#1 discovered active drug (methamphetamine) production in the plant. 
Source #1 stated the methamphetamine lab was partially destroyed by 
Source #1 . This led to a physical confrontation with Source #1 's 
immediate supervisor. Source #1 believes the incident led to Source #1 's 
termination. Source #1 stated there were incidents of weapons being 
carried in Agriprocessors. However, the Source was not sure if they were 
being traded for drugs or being sold. 
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17. Source #1 stated that Agriprocessors is owned by Aaron Rubashkin, who 
resides in New York, and that the day-to-day operations at the plant were 
conducted by Heseshy and Sholom Rubashkin. Source #1 said there are 
Rabbis employed at Agriprocessors who Source #1 believed entered the 
United States from Canada without appropriate immigration documents. 
Source #1 did not provide the basis for this belief. 
18. Source #1 described a conversation with the Agriprocessors Human 
Resources Manager at her office concerning three separate social 
security cards from three separate employees that contained the same 
social security number. Source #1 stated the Human Resources Manager 
laughed when this matter was brought to her attention. 
19. Source #1 stated the Human Resources Manager appeared to have a 
large amount of money. In a conversation Source #1 had with the Human 
Resource Manager's son, who was also employed at Agriprocessors at 
the time, the son bragged about the significant amount of money his 
mother had. Source #1 also discussed a conversation Source #1 had 
with the Human Resources Manager regarding Agriprocessors' 
employees' taxes and the fact they were deducted and deposited and 
placed in bank accounts belonging to an unknown person or persons. 
PAST ARRESTS OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS 
20. On or about August 30, 2007, ICE Special Agents processed a request 
from the Iowa Department of Public Safety for assistance in identifying 
individuals who were involved in an altercation that had occurred in 
Postville, Iowa. The information resulted in the arrests by ICE Special 
Agents and federal prosecution of three subjects. The three subjects, 
identified as Source #2, Source #3, and Source #4, all said they were 
foreign nationals unlawfully present in the United States. 
Source #2 
21 . Source #2 , after being advised of Miranda rights in the Spanish language 
and waiving those rights, stated the source's employment at 
Agriprocessors began in 2005. During the employment application 
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process, Source #2 presented a fraudulent Permanent Resident Alien 
Card ("Form 1-551 ") (bearing number XX-XXX-823) and a fraudulent 
social security card (bearing number XXX-XX-3641) to Agriprocessors. 
Source #2 stated the Source's employment was terminated in 2007. 
Source #2 stated the Source had never applied to Citizenship & 
Immigration Services (hereinafter "CIS,) for authorization to reside or work 
in the United States. 
22. Pursuant to an inquiry by ICE Special Agents, Agriprocessors provided an 
Employment Eligibility Verification Form (hereinafter "Form 1-9") 
apparently filled out and signed by Source #2. The Form 1-9 was certified 
by the Human Resources Manager. The Form 1-9 was accompanied by a 
photocopy of the fraudulent Form 1-551, number XX-XXX-823, presented 
by Source #2 to gain employment at Agriprocessors. 
23. An ICE indices check conducted by ICE Special Agents on Source #2 was 
negative, noting that lawful status in the United States had not been 
previously granted to the subject. A NCIC search of Source #2's 
fingerprints revealed a prior misdemeanor Operating While Intoxicated 
charge. 
Source #3 
24. Source #3, after being advised by ICE Special Agents of Miranda rights in 
the Spanish language and waiving those rights, stated the Source's 
employment at Agriprocessors began in 2003 or 2004. During the 
employment application process, Source #3 presented a fraudulent Form 
1-551 (bearing number XX-XXX-267) and a fraudulent social security card 
(bearing number XXX-XX-8944) to Agriprocessors. Source #3 stated 
his/her employment was terminated sometime in 2004. Source #3 stated 
his/her employment was reestablished at Agriprocessors sometime in 
2005. Source #3 again presented a fraudulent Form 1-551 (bearing 
number XX-XXX-267) and a fraudulent social security card (bearing 
number XXX-XX-8944). Source #3 stated his/her employment was 
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terminated sometime in 2007. Source #3 stated the Source never applied 
to CIS for authorization to reside or work in the United States. 
25. Pursuant to an inquiry by ICE Special Agents, Agriprocessors provided a 
Form 1-9 apparently filled out and signed by Source #3. The Form 1-9 was 
not certified by Agriprocessors as required by law; however, handwritten in 
the Business or Organization Name and Address block was 
"Agriprocessors, Inc. 220 West Street, PO Box 920, Postville, Iowa 
52162." The Form 1-9 was accompanied by a photocopy of the fraudulent 
Form 1-551 presented by Source #3 to gain employment at 
Agriprocessors. 
26. In addition to the Form 1-9, ICE Special Agents received from 
Agriprocessors a letter dated May 4, 2007, written in Spanish and English 
and addressed to Source #3 from the Agriprocessors Human Resources 
Manager. The letter reflected that the SSA had corresponded with 
Agriprocessors and said that the social security number presented to 
Agriprocessors by Source #3 to gain employment did not match the name 
of the person to whom the number had actually been issued as reflected 
in the SSA database. In that letter the Human Resources Manager 
requested Source #3 provide proof the employee was resolving the 
discrepancy with SSA and directed, if this information was not provided, a 
new Form 1-9 must be completed with Agriprocessors by July 9, 2007. 
27. An ICE indices check conducted by ICE Special Agents on Source #3 was 
negative, noting that lawful status in the United States had not been 
previously granted to the subject. A NCIC search of Source #3's 
fingerprints did not reveal any criminal history. 
Source #4 
28. Source #4, after being advised of Miranda rights in the Spanish language 
and waiving those rights, stated Source #4's employment at 
Agriprocessors began in 2005. During the employment application 
process, Source #4 presented a fraudulent Form 1-551 (bearing number 
XX-.XXX-406) and a fraudulent social security card (bearing number XXX-
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XX-7893) to Agriprocessors. Source #4 stated his/her employment was 
terminated in 2007. 
29. Pursuant to an inquiry by an ICE Special Agent, Agriprocessors provided 
a Form 1-9 apparently filled out and signed by Source #4. The Form 1-9 
was not certified by Agriprocessors, as required by law; however 
handwritten in the Business or Organization Name and Address block was 
"Agriprocessors, Inc. 220 West Street, PO Box 920, Postville, Iowa 
52162." The Form 1-9 was accompanied by a photocopy of the fraudulent 
Form 1-551 presented by Source #4 to gain employment at 
Agriprocessors. 
30. An ICE indices check conducted by ICE Special Agents on Source #4 was 
negative, noting that lawful status in the United States had not been 
previously granted to the subject. A NCIC search of Source #4's 
fingerprints revealed a prior misdemeanor Operating While Intoxicated 
charge. 
Source #5 
31. On or about December 6, 2006, ICE Special Agents processed a request 
from the Decorah, Iowa, Police Department regarding a subject later 
identified as Source #5 who was being held on State of Iowa criminal 
charges. Source #5 was determined to be a foreign national unlawfully 
present in the United States. An interview of Source #5 by ICE Special 
Agents revealed Source #5 had been employed at Agriprocessors in 
2006. Source #5 said the Source presented a fraudulent 1-551 bearing a 
fictitious name to gain employment at Agriprocessors. 
32. Pursuant to an inquiry by ICE Special Agents, Agriprocessors provided a 
Form 1-9 bearing the fictitious name and signature of Source #5. The 
Form 1-9 was accompanied by a photocopy of the 1-551 presented by 
Source #5, containing the fictitious name, to gain employment at 
Agriprocessors. ICE Special Agents also recovered from Source #5 at the 
time of his/her remand from the custody of the Winnesheik County 
Sheriff's Office, an Agriprocessors payroll check, in the fictitious name that 
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misdemeanor charge from Nebraska for consumption of alcohol on public 
property. 
Source #6 
34. On September 20, 2007, an ICE Detention & Removal Operations 
(hereinafter "DRO") Immigration Enforcement Agent (hereinafter "lEA") 
processed Source #6, an illegal alien from Mexico, for immigration 
removal proceedings after Source #6 was remanded to ICE custody from 
the Fayette County Sheriff's after disposition of a misdemeanor Operating 
While Intoxicated charge. Source #6 stated the Source began 
employment with Agriprocessors in 2004 on one of the farms as an 
undocumented worker. The employment lasted two years. Source #6 
was subsequently interviewed by an ICE Special Agent. Source #6 stated 
the Source presented a fraudulent 1-551 and a fraudulent social security 
card for employment, and a form 1-9 was completed at Agriprocessors. 
No 1-9 has been requested of Agriprocessors. 
Source #7 
35. On November 8, 2007, ICE Special Agents met with a confidential source 
that had been previously used as a source of information by ICE 
(hereinafter "Source #7"). Source #7 is currently authorized to work in the 
United States based on an employment authorization document issued by 
DHS/CIS. Source #7 has proven to be credible and has assisted in other 
cases. Source #7's information and assistance in these prior cases led to 
the conviction of two people on identity and document fraud charges. 
Source #7 has been provided monetary assistance by ICE Office of 
12 
Investigations for new cell phone service obtained as a result of this case, 
for living expenses, rent, transportation costs, and to compensate for loss 
of wages due to the wage disparity from Source #7's prior job, while 
providing information in this investigation. A search of NCIC criminal 
history information for Source #7 was negative. 
36. On November 8, 2007, ICE Special Agents wired Source #7 with an 
electronic audio monitoring device. At the direction of ICE Special 
Agents, Source #7 went to Agriprocessors where Source #7 asked for, 
and received, an employment application. Source #7 spoke to a female 
employee who apparently works in the Human Resources Department 
and speaks Spanish. Source #7 told the female the Source was not in 
possession of a social security number to use. The female 
Agriprocessors employee stated she could not hire Source #7 without 
one. Source #7 departed the building and, on a street adjacent to the 
previously departed building, Source #7 spoke with a person identified as 
an Agriprocessors employee about getting a job at the company. The 
apparent Agriprocessors employee stated that there were other 
employees in the turkey processing area of the plant that are working 
without papers. Source #7 understood this to mean illegal aliens were 
working even though they did not have Social Security numbers. Source 
#7 asked if the employee knew where a person could purchase fraudulent 
papers in the local area. The employee stated that there was someone in 
the area, but the employee didn't have a contact name. The employee 
stated, however, that there was a guy (hereafter referenced to as "C") in 
the turkey processing area who allowed employees under his direction to 
work without papers, implying he was a supervisor. The employee 
provided Source #7 her/his telephone number. 
37. On November 9, 2007, ICE Special Agents directed Source #7 to attempt 
to telephone the Agriprocessors employee that the Source spoke to the 
previous day, with negative results. ICE Special Agents wired an 
electronic audio monitoring device to Source #7 and directed Source #7 to 
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attempt to locate the Agriprocessors employee from the previous day, but 
Source #7 was unsuccessful. Source #7 talked to a different Hispanic 
male near Agriprocessors who identified himself as a Guatemalan 
national. The Hispanic male stated that the Agriprocessors business 
office would not hire without having "papers". However, the Hispanic male 
stated there was a supervisor in the turkey processing area who would 
employ the Source without papers and pay cash. Source #7 departed 
and went to a different area in Postville, Iowa. Source #7 spoke to two 
other Hispanic males who gave the same information about gaining 
employment "without papers" in the turkey processing area and one 
offered to show Source #7 where the supervisor lived. The unidentified 
Hispanic male led Source #7 to a home in Postville where they went to the 
door and made contact with the purported supervisor's spouse, who 
stated that the supervisor was not at home and provided a telephone 
number to Source #7 to call. The supervisor's spouse identified her 
husband by the name of "C." Source #7 left the home with the Hispanic 
male who stated the named supervisor paid employees separately in 
cash. Source #7 attempted to make a recorded telephone call to the 
telephone number provided, but was unsuccessful. Source #7 attempted 
to contact the supervisor once again at his home, but was unsuccessful. 
Another attempt to make a recorded telephone call to the supervisor was 
finally successful. Source #7 told the supervisor that Source #7 was 
looking for a job in Postville, whereupon the supervisor stated he could 
not talk and could meet tomorrow. The call was terminated. 
38. On November 10, 2007, ICE Special Agents directed Source #7 to make 
a telephone call to the supervisor, "C." The call was not recorded . 
During the call, the supervisor told Source #7 to go to Agriprocessors and 
fill out an application. 
39. On November 14, 2007, ICE Special Agents wired Source #7 with an 
electronic audio monitoring device. At the direction of ICE Special 
Agents, Source #7 went to "C's" house where Source #7 met with him and 
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Source #7 reminded her/him that they had spoken on the telephone 
previously. Source #7 inquired about employment at Agriprocessors 
without having any papers. "C," the supervisor, initially stated that Source 
#7 should fix Source #7's social security number to be able to work. 
Source #7 stated that, based on previous conversations with other 
employees, Source #7 understood the supervisor would hire Source #7 
without papers and pay cash. "C" stated he would speak to the Human 
Resources Manager at the plant to inquire about employment and call 
Source #7. Source #7 later positively identified "C" through a copy of "C's" 
driver's license photo, and your affiant has confirmed that "C" is, in fact, a 
supervisor employed at Agriprocessors. Source #7 left and went to other 
locations in Postville, Iowa where Source #7 heard from other individuals 
about getting hired by the supervisor and working for cash. Source #7 
learned the Agriprocessors employees working for the supervisor wore 
orange hard hats and, apparently, the employees that provided proof of 
lawful employment wore green hats. Later that afternoon, Source #7 
spoke to a neighbor at Source #7's apartment building about the attempts 
to gain employment with the supervisor. The neighbor stated the 
supervisor normally requires a referral from someone he knew and the 
neighbor stated he may know someone who would refer Source #7. 
40. On November 16, 2007, ICE Special Agents wired Source #7 with an 
audio recording device. Source #7 made contact with numerous residents 
of Postville. Source #7 was informed again by these contacts that "C," the 
supervisor, hired employees with no employment documents and they 
were paid cash. Source #7 also heard that there is an Agriprocessors 
employee that transported other employees to Minnesota to obtain state 
identification documents. Source #7 met with an employee of 
Agriprocessors who stated that Source #7 could obtain a job as a forklift 
operator at the plant, but Source #7 would need employment documents. 
41 . On November 17,2007, Source #7, using an audio recording device 
provided by ICE Special Agents, engaged other Postville, Iowa residents 
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in conversation. They stated they did not believe the supervisor was 
currently hiring. However, they stated there may be another 
Agriprocessors manager who was hiring employees without employment 
documents and paying cash. 
42. On December 5, 2007, ICE Special Agents wired Source #7 with an audio 
monitoring device. ICE also provided Source #7 with a counterfeit social 
security card and Form 1-551, containing unassigned numbers, to be used 
in an attempt to gain employment. Source #7 entered the Agriprocessors 
Human Resources Department and was told by an employee to take an 
application home and return with it the following Tuesday. 
43. On December 11, 2007, ICE Special Agents wired Source #7 with an 
audio monitoring device. ICE Special Agents provided Source #7 with a 
counterfeit social security card and Form 1-551, containing a fictitious 
name and unassigned numbers, to be used in an attempt to gain 
employment. Source #7 went to the Agriprocessors Human Resources 
office, where Source #7 provided a female Human Resources employee 
with the completed application and with the documents provided by ICE 
Special Agents. The female employee returned with the Source #7's 
documents and stated that they didn't match (meaning the name and 
numbers didn't match). The female employee also stated this to at least 
one of the other approximately 10 applicants in the waiting room. Source 
#7 had a conversation with the other rejected applicant, and the applicant 
provided Source #7 a telephone number where Source #7 could 
potentially obtain good documents. 
44. On December 13, 2007, Source #7 told ICE Special Agents that Source 
#7 called the telephone number provided by the other rejected applicant 
from Agriprocessors and a Hispanic-sounding male answered. Source #7 
inquired about obtaining identity documents to gain employment at 
Agriprocessors. The Hispanic male stated that he was in California; 
however, he could send identification documents via the mail. The 
Hispanic male· said he had sent documents previously to residents of 
16 
. '•' '• 
Postville, but they were not successful in obtaining employment based on 
how strict Agriprocessors had become in their hiring process. Source #7 
asked the Hispanic male if he could obtain any good documents, like a 
birth certificate, and the Hispanic male replied he did not have any at that 
time. Source #7 was directed by ICE Special Agents to not call the 
Hispanic male again but to wait for a return call. According to the 
information received by ICE Special Agents from Source #7, this return 
call did not occur. 
45. On January 8, 2008, ICE Special Agents wired Source #7 with an 
electronic audio monitoring device. Source #7 made contact with the 
Agriprocessors Human Resources office to present a valid social security 
card provided by ICE Special Agents that contained information relating to 
a legitimate number for a presumed United States citizen. The social 
security number Source #7 provided on this occasion was different from 
the social security number he had presented to Agriprocessors the prior 
week, though slhe used the same name as before. Source #7 did not 
witness the use of computers by Agriprocessors Human Resources staff; 
however, the Source stated the Human Resources Manager would 
periodically return to her office during the application process. Source #7 
completed the initial application for the hiring process and was dismissed 
for lunch to return later that day. Source #7 told ICE Special Agents there 
were approximately 30 applicants for employment at the Human 
Resources area. The Human Resources manager informed 
approximately 12 of those applicants that they could not be hired due to 
their documents not having legitimate identification numbers. After a 
lunch period, Source #7 returned to the Agriprocessors Human Resources 
department, completed the Form 1-9 as well as some type of insurance 
paperwork, and attended a safety briefing. This training and completion 
of paperwork were done in the presence of the Human Resources 
Manager. Source #7 stated s/he was hired at $7.25 an hour and was 
assigned the duty of hanging cattle in the plant. Source #7 was informed 
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to report back the next day to complete orientation, and the day after that 
Source #7 would begin employment. Source #7 stated all of the 
applicants present appeared to be Hispanic and Source #7 believed they 
were all illegally present in the United States, except one female who 
claimed to Source #7 to be a United States citizen. Two of the applicants 
claimed to have just crossed the United States border. Source #7 stated 
the Human Resources Manager appeared to be aware that some of the 
employment applicants may be illegal aliens based on her statements, 
directions, and the assistance she provided. Source #7 gave an example 
of the Human Resources Manager informing the applicants that provided 
her with 1-551's for employment that they are supposed to be "legal" so 
they needed to check the permanent resident alien box on the Form 1-9. 
The Agriprocessors Human Resources employee stated (in Spanish) to 
Source #7 and the fellow applicants for employment, while assisting them 
in the completion of Form 1-9, that: 
"Those that are American citizens are going to put an X in the first 
square. Those who are permanent residents are going to put an X on the 
second square. Those who are only foreign (unintelligible portion of tape). 
I believe the majority are permanent residents but those who have a 
driver's licen . .. Those who have shown a driver's license, I don't know 
what they are." 
The applicants laughed. The Agriprocessors Human Resources 
employee continued and spoke to Source #7 and stated "Okay, Your ... 
Mark the first square. U, I don't know what". Source #7 stated "Citizen." 
The Agriprocessors Human Resources employee continued "Mark the first 
square. Okay?" Apparently the applicants continued to find humor in this 
situation and they and the Agriprocessors Human Resources employee 
continued to laugh. The Agriprocessors Human Resources employee 
continued to assist the applicants with ascertaining their immigration 
status in the United States and then continued helping them complete the 
1-9 and assisting individuals that produced immigration documents as to 
what an immigration 'A' number is and where to place it. The 
Agriprocessors Human Resources employee continued to explain what 
type of immigration documents should constitute a check mark in which 
box. Additionally the Agriprocessors Human Resources employee cited 
that underneath the squares, indicated above, that there was a line for an 
employee's signature. An Agriprocessors Human Resources employee 
stated that "your signature should be your first and last names." She 
assisted all of the applicants with the employment forms and apparently 
speaks fluent Spanish. She provided the safety briefing in Spanish. 
46. On January 9, 2008, ICE Special Agents wired Source #7 with an audio 
recording device. Source #7 made contact with the Agriprocessors 
Human Resources department to continue the orientation process. 
Source #7 stated that the orientation consisted of more safety briefings 
conducted by a female Agriprocessors employee. During the safety 
briefings, one of the points emphasized was the safe handling of knives at 
the meat processing plant that are used in the process of butchering the 
various animals processed at Agriprocessors. Based on the observations 
of Source #7, a large number of knives are used by employees in the 
Agriprocessors facility. The Agriprocessors Human Resources employee 
continued later on in the briefing and stated that employees would be 
docked two dollars a week from their pay for the use of gowns and glove, 
of which usage is mandatory. Source #7 was also notified that a proximity 
card would be issued for entry into Agriprocessors. 
47. On January 10, 2008, Source #7 contacted an ICE Special Agent to 
inform the agent that Source #7 began employment at Agriprocessors and 
worked 14 hours that day. Source #7 stated an identification/proximity 
card was issued to enter the plant and to electronically clock the hours 
worked. Source #7 said a co-worker told her/him that the co-worker did 
not have good papers and that he does not electronically clock in and out, 
but instead signs in and out. Source #7 stated that the co-worker may be 
paid in cash. Source #7 stated that the equipment issued to perform the 
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work in the hazardous conditions of the plant was substandard and 
previously used. 
48. On January 18, 2008, Source #7 told ICE Special Agents that there 
appeared to be four to six hundred employees working during the same 
time frame as Source #7 and approximately one hundred additional 
employees departing from the midnight shift when Source .#7 arrived for 
work in the morning. Source #7 stated there was at least one other 
employee who was earning less than Source #7 was earning and at least 
one other employee that Source #7 believed to be illegal and received a 
different colored check than Source #7. Source #7 stated the 
identification/proximity card issued to Source #7 on the first day of 
employment was used each work day initially at a security gate near the 
human resources building. ICE Special Agents observed that Source #7's 
identification card appeared to have a proximity device attached to it to 
electronically access the Agriprocessors complex. Source #7 said that 
once an employee was in the main meat processing area at 
Agriprocessors, the identification card was again used for further access. 
In the alternative, employees could manually enter their employee number 
that is also contained on the card. Source #7 stated there was a light 
sensor machine adjacent to the location where the identification card is 
used and that the subject's hand was placed on this device and was 
scanned. Even when using the light sensor machine, an employee must 
still use a swipe card or enter their ID number. Source #7 stated there are 
many Rabbis employed inside the plant and some speak Spanish. 
Source #7 also observed that the laborers, including Source #7, wore 
white hats; the cleaning/trash crew wore brown hats; the inspectors wore 
red hats; the team leaders wore green hats; and the supervisors wore 
yellow hats and carried radios. 
49. On January 25, 2008, Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the 
prior week's pay stub that reflected hours worked and included overtime 
pay. The pay stub appeared to be generated by computer and contained 
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Source #7's name and the last four digits of the social security number 
Source #7 provided to Agriprocessors. Source #7 stated there was an 
employee that had been working for the past two months who stated he 
was from Guatemala and received a different colored check than Source 
#7. The Guatemalan's check did not have uAgriprocessors" written in the 
corner (as did the checks Source #7 received). Source #7 also described 
an oral altercation by a Rabbi who was calling employees derogatory 
names and throwing meat at employees. Source #7 said the employees 
in the chicken processing area were suspected of being paid cash and 
apparently ·wore blue hats. Source #7 also said the rent for the Source's 
apartment in Postville had been increased and, based on what other 
Hispanics told him, it was a common practice for the landlords who rented 
to tenants in that area to frequently increase rents. 
50. On February 1, 2008, Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the 
prior week's pay stub that reflected hours worked and included overtime 
pay. Source #7 said there was a co-worker that Source #7 met whose 
paycheck was a different color and who did not have an Agriprocessors 
identification card. The co-worker asked one of the Rabbis why he didn't 
have an employee card to swipe through the time clock. The Rabbi told 
the co-worker the worker would have to have shown valid documents to 
obtain one. According to the co-worker, he brought a green card the next 
day and the Rabbi somehow checked it and said it wasn't valid. The co-
worker was allowed to continue in his previous employment capacity. 
Source #7 stated another Rabbi asked Source #7 if the documents 
Source #7 presented were valid . The Rabbi continued with the 
conversation and cited the state of origin for the social security card 
Source #7 provided for employment (without Source #7 previously 
indicating where it was issued). The Rabbi asked Source #7 where s/he 
was born. Source #7 stated s/he was born in the State indicated on 
her/his Social Security card , but explained s/he traveled back to Mexico at 
a young age. The Rabbi said that was good because the rest of the 
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workers did not have any papers. Source #7 stated there was another 
increase in rent at the Source's apartment. 
51 . On February 15, 2008, Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the 
prior week's pay stub that reflected hours worked that included overtime 
pay. Source #7 said a group of between 50 and 100 employees, that 
Source #7 believed to be illegal, had never presented documents to gain 
employment at Agriprocessors. They received a different colored pay 
check than did Source #7. According to what Source #7 heard from other 
employees, these employees were supposedly told by Agriprocessors 
management to provide identification documents in the next thirty days or 
they would be terminated. 
52. On February 22, 2008, Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the 
prior week's pay stub that reflected hours worked that included overtime 
pay. Source #7 said one of the floor supervisors, identified by Source #7 
as a Hasidic Jew, duct-taped. the eyes of an employee that Source #7 
believed to be an undocumented Guatemalan. The floor supervisor then 
took one of the meat hooks and hit the Guatemalan with it, apparently not 
causing serious injuries. Source #7 asked the Guatemalan to report this 
incident to the front office, but the Guatemalan stated that it would not do 
any good and could jeopardize his job. Another incident occurred where a 
different floor supervisor, identified by Source #7 as a Hasidic Jew, 
pushed Source #7 because the supervisor did not like the way Source #7 
was moving meat. Source #7 said the persons Source #7 believes to be 
undocumented Guatemalans were experiencing difficulties getting paid 
their different colored checks and they were asked to return at 4:00P.M. 
on Friday to receive them after being dismissed from work for the day at 
1:00 P.M. 
53. On February 29, 2008, Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the 
prior week's pay stub that reflected hours worked that included overtime 
pay. Source #7 said , from what other workers are telling him/her, the 
undocumented Guatemalans that were paid via a different colored check 
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have begun to obtain fraudulent documents to present to Agriprocessors. 
Source #7 said there was a person believed to be a Mexican national 
working at Agriprocessors who was providing fraudulent documents 
through a vendor in Postville. Source #7 was not able to provide further 
details. 
54. On March 7, 2008, Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the prior 
week's pay stub that reflected hours worked that included overtime pay. 
Source #7 said s/he saw some of the checks the undocumented 
Guatemalans were provided by Agriprocessors and they were green. 
Source #7 stated the neighbor of Source #7 handles trash at 
Agriprocessors and wore a white hard hat. 
55. On March 15, 2008, Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the prior 
week's pay stub that reflected hours worked that included overtime pay. 
Source #7 said a former co-worker told Source #7 that a Postville 
resident, possibly a local government official, was in charge of the green 
checks issued to the undocumented workers at Agriprocessors. Source 
#7 said the resident was known as "Mr. Boss" and no other identifiers 
were known to Source #7. Source #7 said upper-level managers wore 
orange hats, the Rabbis and chicken workers wore blue hats, the group 
supervisors wore yellow hats, the foremen wore green hats, the inspectors 
wore red hats, and the remaining floor workers wore white hats. 
56. On March 28, 2008, Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the prior 
week's pay stub that reflected hours worked and included overtime pay. 
Source #7 restated that, upon entry to Agriprocessors' main meat 
processing area where Source #7 was employed, an employee placed his 
or her hand on a scanner that has four lights and two posts with which to 
align the hand. The employee identification number is input into a 
machine that allows a green light to come on apparently indicating the 
name and number match. Source #7 restated employees hired without 
papers did not use this scanner. Source #7 stated a Guatemalan 
employed on the same line as Source #7 has received fraudulent 
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documents and submitted them to the Agriprocessors Human Resources 
office. Source #7 stated Agriprocessors was continuing to hire new 
employees as well. Source #7 related a conversation Source #7 had with 
another employee; that employee stated he had a conversation with a 
supervisor and asked the supervisor where they should go if Immigration 
came. The supervisor stated Immigration wouldn't be coming because 
Agriprocessors takes taxes out of the employees' checks. Additionally, 
Source #7 stated there were mostly Mexican and Guatemalan nationals, 
as well as some El Salvadorians, employed at Agriprocessors. 
57. On April 04, 2008, Source #7 stated Agriprocessors continued to hire new 
employees and had recently terminated some females as well as other 
employees Source #7 believed to be juveniles. 
58. On April 11, 2008, Source #7 stated his/her shift was from 2:00 a.m. until 
2:00 p.m. Source #7 provided ICE Special Agents with the prior two 
weeks' pay stubs that reflected hours worked and overtime pay. Source 
#7 stated Agriprocessors did not hire last week and had terminated six 
young male employees for reasons unknown to Source #7. Source #7 
stated there was talk among the employees of Immigration coming to raid 
the plant; however, Source #7 did not feel it was resulting in a wide 
spread fear. Source #7 also said one of the Rabbis previously involved in 
demonstrating violent behavior with employees was again involved in an 
oral altercation in which the Rabbi called an employee "stupid." Source 
#7 said s/he had heard from other employees that the turkey processing 
area of Agriprocessors was in operation on the south side of the railroad 
tracks from the main meat processing plant where Source #7 was 
employed. ICE Special Agents provided Source #7 with an overhead 
picture of the Agriprocessors complex where Source #7 pointed out a 
series of buildings adjacent to and to the south of the railroad tracks area 
where the turkey processing took place. 
59. On April 18, 2008, Source# 7 provided ICE Special Agents the prior 
week's pay stub that reflected hours worked and overtime pay. 
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Additionally, Source# 7 stated that two individuals with beards, and 
identified as brothers as well as the owners by a co-worker, visited the 
Agriprocessors meat processing line. Source# 7 also stated that, a 
couple of weeks ago, the last four undocumented Guatemalans were fired 
by Agriprocessors. The Source stated the supervisor identified as "C" 
may be working nights in a different part of the plant. 
60. On Apri125, 2008, Source# 7 provided ICE Special Agents the prior 
week's pay stub reflecting hours worked and overtime pay. ICE Special 
Agents showed Source# 7 a photo retrieved from the Internet 
(http://recognitionsystems. ingersollrand.com) of the Ingersoll Rand 
(hereinafter "IR") Hand Punch Biometric Time and Attendance Terminal 
Model4000. The Source confirmed that the Hand Punch terminal on the 
photograph appeared to match the system used by Agriprocessors to 
record time and attendance. Source# 7 also told ICE Special Agents that 
s/he spoke to a neighbor who told the Source that s/he had heard that 
approximately 60 employees who work for "C" were going to be fired. The 
Source # 7 did not receive any further intelligence relating to this 
information. The neighbor also told the Source that the neighbor's brother 
was traveling to Postville, Iowa from Guatemala in an attempt to gain 
employment at Agriprocessors. Source # 7 did not gain any further 
intelligence relating to this information. Source# 7 also told ICE Special 
Agents that "Mr. Boss" is the owner of an apartment complex in Postville, 
Iowa. 
61 . Previous intelligence received by ICE Special Agents has revealed that a 
man by the name of R. W. works for the elementary school in Postville, 
Iowa and recently sold an apartment complex to Agriprocessors. R. W. is 
also known to carry an envelope of cash with him/her at school to pay 
employees of Agriprocessors. R. W. is also listed as the point of contact 
on letters sent by Agriprocessors to employees noting that they have been 
identified as having misunderstandings regarding the employee's social 
security number. 
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Sources 8. 9, & 10 
62. On or about May 1, 2006, ICE Special Agents assisted the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation with identifying individuals involved with the 
production of a potential explosive device. The device was found in a 
vehicle registered to a resident of Postville. Further investigation showed 
the likely source for the materials used to construct this device was the 
Agriprocessors mechanical shop. When officers attempted to interview 
three suspects at Agriprocessors concerning their knowledge of the 
explosive device found in the car, and the owner and operator of the car, 
an Agriprocessors supervisor ("C") escorted the employees to the office 
for the interview and gave one employee a fictional name to provide to 
officers regarding the person who sold them the car. On May 4, 2006, 
pursuant to this investigation, ICE Special Agents arrested three subjects, 
identified here as Source #8, Source #9, and Source #1 0. 
Source#8 
63. Source #8, in a consensual interview conducted in the Spanish language 
prior to arrest by ICE on May 4, 2006, was shown his/her employment 
application for Source # 8 on file with Agriprocessors. Source #8 began 
employment in 2004. Source #8's application contained the social 
security number XXX-XX-9281. A photocopy of the fraudulent Form 1-551 
(bearing number XX-XXX-871) that Source #8 presented in conjunction 
with the completion of the 1-9 was shown to Source #8. Source #8 
admitted the document was fraudulent and purchased through an 
illegitimate source, in conjunction with the social security card , and that 
both were used to gain employment at Agriprocessors. 
64. An ICE indices check conducted by ICE Special Agents on Source #8 was 
negative, noting that lawful status in the United States had not been 
previously granted to the subject. A NClC search of Source #8's 
fingerprints did not reveal any prior criminal history. 
65. During a search of Source #8's residence in Postville on May 4, 2006, 
agents recovered a SSA Request for Employee Information letter- OMB 
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Form 0960-0508 (commonly referred to as SSA Decentralized 
Correspondence or "DECOR Letter"), dated April 22, 2006, and 
addressed to Source #8. The DECOR letter pertained to the tax year 
2005 earnings Source #8 received from Agriprocessors. The DECOR 
letter is a document sent by the SSA to employees when the SSA has 
determined the Social Security number utilized by an employee does not 
match SSA records. Thus, the DECOR letter serves as a notice to 
employees of potential non-matching social security information. 
Source #9 
66. Source #9, in a consensual interview conducted in the Spanish language 
prior to arrest by ICE on May 4, 2006, was shown his/her employment 
application on file with Agriprocessors. Source #9 began employment in 
2002. Source #9's application contained the social security number XXX-
XX-8316. A photocopy of the fraudulent Form 1-551 (bearing number XX-
XXX-153) that Source #9 presented in conjunction with the completion of 
the 1-9 was shown to Source #9. Source #9 admitted it was a fraudulent 
document and was purchased through an illegitimate source, in 
conjunction with the social security.card, and that both were used to gain 
employment at Agriprocessors. 
67. An ICE indices check conducted by ICE Special Agents on Source #9 was 
negative, noting that lawful status in the United States had not been 
previously granted to the subject. A NCIC search of Source #9's 
fingerprints did not reveal any prior criminal history. 
Source #10 
68. On May 4, 2006, an ICE Special Agent, with FBI Special Agents present, 
conducted a consensual interview in the Spanish language of Source #1 0. 
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ICE Special Agents subsequently obtained Source #1 D's employment 
application file from Agriprocessors, along with his/her Form 1-9. 
Employment documents showed Source #1 0 began employment in 2005. 
Source #1 O's application contained the social security number XXX-XX-
8756. A fraudulent Form 1-551 (bearing number XX-XXX-388) and social 
security card (bearing number XXX-XX-8756), that Source #1 0 provided 
when filling out the 1-9 were found while the search of the home where 
Source #10 resided was conducted. The Form 1-9 was not certified by 
Agriprocessors, as required by law; however, handwritten in the Business 
or Organization Name and Address block was "Agriprocessors, Inc., 220 
West St., PO Box 920, Postville, Iowa 52162." Source #10 admitted both 
of these documents were fraudulent and purchased through an 
illegitimate source. 
69. An ICE indices check conducted by ICE Special Agents on Source #1 0 
was negative, noting that lawful status in the United States had not been 
previously granted to the subject. A NCIC search of Source #1 O's 
fingerprints did not reveal any prior criminal history. 
Source #11 
70. On April14, 2008, ICE agents spoke to Source #11 who had come to ICE 
custody from the Allamakee County Sheriff's Department after disposition 
of a misdemeanor charge. Source #11 said the Source gained 
employment at Agriprocessors in 2007, without presenting employment 
documents or filling out any employment forms. Instead, Source #11 said 
a friend working at Agriprocessors asked an unknown supervisor at 
Agriprocessors if Source #11 could be employed. That same day, Source 
#11 began working at Agriprocessors. Source #11 stated that, when the 
first paycheck was received, it had another unknown person's name on it. 
This check was then taken to another portion of the plant where it was 
cashed. A work identification card with a proximity sensor attached was 
issued to Source #11 in the same last name under which s/he was paid, 
but with a different first name. 
71 . On April 17, 2008, an ICE Special Agent conducted a follow-up interview 
of Source #11 . Source #11 stated the Source worked in the north end of 
the large main meat processing plant where Agriprocessors' employees 
processed chickens. ICE Special Agents showed Source #11 an aerial 
map of the Agriprocessors' complex, which included buildings located 
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generally south of railroad tracks which run through a portion of the 
Agriprocessors facility. The area south of the railroad tracks is believed to 
be a portion of the former Iowa Turkey Products, Inc. Source #11 said 
that area is where other Agriprocessors employees process turkeys. 
Source #11 said the Source knows this because this is where Source #11 
had friends that worked. Source #11 stated both areas had mostly 
Hispanic workers from Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras and the 
undocumented workers were employed alongside the presumably 
documented employees. The difference, Source #11 stated, was the 
undocumented workers were paid $5.00 an hour, and after three or four 
months of working they started making $6.00. Source #11 stated the 
undocumented workers were paid in cash and emphasized this point by 
pretending to count out money by hand. However, Source #11 stated the 
employees that had been seen clocking in and out are all using an 
electronic swipe card used to enter the building and track their time. This 
process did not produce a paper punch card, but rather produced an 
electronic record of an employee's hours. Based on the description of the 
system provided by the sources, it appears the swipe cards generate an 
electronic record, through a centralized computer database located on the 
Agriprocessors site, from which payroll is calculated. 
72. On January 31, 2008, ICE ORO lEA processed Source #12, an illegal 
alien from Mexico, for immigration removal proceedings after Source #12 
was remanded from the Allamakee County Sheriff's Office after 
disposition of State criminal charges. The lEA interviewed Source #12 
and, based on what Source #12 said or how the agent interpreted what 
Source #12 said, the agent understood that Source #12 worked for "Con 
Agri Processors" as an undocumented worker from approximately 2002 to 
the present. Source #12 was subsequently interviewed by ICE Special 
Agents. During that interview, Source #12 said s/he was employed at 
Agriprocessors for the past five or six years. Source #12 said s/he did not 
initially complete a form 1-9 when s/he began working at Agriprocessors. 
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Source #12 said s/he was paid cash for the first year of employment and 
subsequently filled out a form 1-9 using a Mexican Consular Identification 
card . Source #12 said s/he had been in contact with a manager from 
Agriprocessors while incarcerated; the manager stated Source #12 could 
come back to work at Agriprocessors after s/he was released. 
73. Pursuant to an inquiry by ICE Special Agents, Agriprocessors provided 
the Form 1-9 filled out and signed by Source #12 on August 19, 2003. 
The social security number annotated on the form 1-9 was XXX-XX-0207. 
The form 1-9 was certified by an Agriprocessors Human Resources 
Assistant and the Business or Organization Name and Address block was 
filled in with "Agriprocessors, Inc. 220 West St., PO Box 920, Postville, 
Iowa 52162." The Form 1-9 was accompanied by photocopies of the front 
and back of a fraudulent form 1-551 (number XX-XXX-055) presented by 
Source #12 to gain employment at Agriprocessors. 
74. A subsequent post-Miranda interview of Source #12 was conducted by 
ICE Special Agents. The Agents showed Source #12 his/her form 1-9 and 
attached copies of the form 1-551. Source #12 said s/he had procured a 
fraudulent 1-551 and social security card through an illegitimate source 
and subsequently presented them for employment at Agriprocessors. 
According to Source #12, the Source completed the form 1-9 and 
presented the form 1-551 and social security card to Agriprocessors after 
Source #12 had worked at Agriprocessors for one year and after Source 
#12 received a letter from Agriprocessors requesting proof of eligibility for 
employment. 
75. An ICE indices check conducted by the lEA on Source #12 was negative, 
noting that lawful status in the United States had not been previously 
granted to the Source. A NCIC search of Source #12's fingerprints 
revealed two prior Operating While Intoxicated misdemeanor charges and 
a Sexual Abuse 2nd, the latter of which appeared to be dismissed. 
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------------------------·-·-·· . ______ .... . 
OTHER CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF ILLEGAL ALIENS WORKING AT 
AGRIPROCESSORS 
76. Between approximately 2004 to 2007, law enforcement authorities in Iowa 
encountered at least 9 individuals in connection with the investigation of 
other criminal conduct by those people, including fighting, criminal 
mischief, drug activity, driving offenses and other matters. During 
subsequent investigations by ICE Special Agents, these individuals were 
found to be in the United States unlawfully, and to have obtained false 
and fraudulent identification documents in order to secure employment. 
Through the use of these false documents, these nine people worked at 
Agriprocessors from approximately 2004 to 2006. Each of these nine 
people were subsequently convicted of violations of federal criminal law. 
NOTICES SENT TO AGRIPROCESSORS OF NON-MATCHING SOCIAL 
SECURITY NUMBERS 
77. Information was previously obtained by ICE Special Agents from law 
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enforcement sources of numerous partial SSA Employer Correction 
Request for Educational Correspondence (hereinafter "EDCOR") letters 
addressed to Agriprocessors. These partial EDCOR letters list the 
discrepancies between employee names and the social security numbers 
reported by the employer on Wage and Tax statements (Forms W-2) for a 
specific tax year. This discrepancy normally means that the social 
security number and name do not match what is contained in the SSA's 
official records. It could also mean the number reported by 
Agriprocessors has not yet been issued to any person. These EDCOR 
letters revealed that Agriprocessors was notified via five separate letters 
of 500 social security number discrepancies, one letter of 461 social 
security number discrepancies, one letter of 68 social security number 
discrepancies, one letter of 52 social security number discrepancies, one 
letter of 42 social security number discrepancies, one letter of 37 social 
security number discrepancies, one letter of 24 social security number 
discrepancies, and one letter of 22 social security number discrepancies 
for the tax years as follows: 
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a. An EDCOR letter dated May 05, 2006, from SSA to 
Agriprocessors, stated there were at least 500 social security 
number discrepancies for employee records relating to the tax year 
2005. 
b. An EDCOR letter dated April 21, 2006, from SSA to 
Agriprocessors, stated there were 68 social security number 
discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 2005. 
c. An EDCOR letter dated March 24, 2006, from SSA to 
Agriprocessors, stated there were 52 social security number 
discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 2004. 
d. An EDCOR letter dated March 24, 2006, from SSA to 
Agriprocessors, stated there were 42 social security number 
discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 2003. 
e. An EDCOR letter dated March 24, 2006, from SSA to 
Agriprocessors, stated there were 37 social security number 
discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 2002. 
f. An EDCOR letter dated March 24, 2006, from SSA to 
Agriprocessors, stated there were 24 social security number 
discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 2000. 
g. An EDCOR letter dated May 19, 2005, from SSA to 
Agriprocessors, stated there were at least 500 social security 
number discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 
2004. 
h. An EDCOR letter dated May 19, 2005, from SSA to 
Agriprocessors, stated there were at least 500 social security 
number discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 
2003. 
I. An EDCOR letter dated May 19, 2005, from SSA to 
Agriprocessors, stated there were at least 500 social security 
number discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 
2002. 
j. An EDCOR letter dated May 19, 2005, from SSA to 
Agriprocessors, stated there were at least 500 social security 
number discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 
2001. 
k. An EDCOR letter dated May 19, 2005, frpm SSA to 
Agriprocessors, stated there were 461 social security number 
discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 2000. 
I. An EDCOR letter dated May 09, 2002, from SSA to 
Agriprocessors, stated there were 22 social security number 
discrepancies for employee records relating to tax year 2001. 
78. On February 28, 2008, ICE Special Agents received from the SSA the 
EDCOR letters sent to Agriprocessors during 2006. The information 
returned consisted of one EDCOR letter sent from SSA to Agriprocessors 
on April 21 , 2006, and one EDCOR letter sent on May 05, 2006. 
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a. The copy of the EDCOR letter sent on April 21, 2006, to 
Agriprocessors reflected that SSA informed Agriprocessors that 68 
of the social security numbers reported by the company for tax year 
2005 did not agree with SSA records. 
b. The copy of the EDCOR letter sent on May 05, 2006, to 
Agriprocessors reflected that the SSA informed Agriprocessors that 
at least 500 of the social security numbers reported by the 
company for tax year 2005 did not agree with SSA records. 
The SSA stated there were no EDCOR letters sent to Agriprocessors 
during calendar year 2007. The SSA confirmed in its response that it 
does not maintain copies of any Decentralized Correspondence 
("DECOR") letters notifying individual employees that the social security 
number used by that employee during a specific time period does not 
agree with SSA records. Unlike EDCOR letters, which are sent to 
employers, DECOR letters are sent to employees to let the employee 
know the reported name and social security numbers do not match SSA 
records. DECOR letters may be sent to an employer, however, when an 
employee's address is incomplete or incorrect. 
79. A search of the SSA public website for information on EDCOR letters 
revealed that employers are only sent an ED COR letter for the first 500 
employees found with social security number discrepancies, based on 
Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter "IRS") W-2 information submitted 
by that employer, and it is incumbent on the employer to obtain additional 
no-match information on any additional discrepancies above the 500 
already received. 
ICE ANALYSIS OF 2007 NO-MATCH INFORMATION 
80. On or about October 12, 2007, ICE Special Agents inquired of CIS 
whether Agriprocessors was a registered participant in the Enumeration 
Verification System ("EVS"). EVS is a CIS-sponsored employer program 
that allows a company to submit an employee's name and social security 
number to the SSA for verification. The SSA then verifies whether the 
employee's name matches the name to which the social security number 
was assigned, and conveys the information to the company. CIS reported 
that Agriprocessors is not a participant in EVS. On or about April 22, 
2008, ICE Special Agents again checked with CIS to determine if 
Agriprocessors had, since October 2007, registered to participate in EVS, 
and determined that it had not. 
81. In February 2008, ICE Special Agents obtained "no match" information 
from the SSA for employees at Agriprocessors during the last two 
quarters of 2007 and analyzed that information. On February 20, 2008, 
ICE agents received social security "no match" information from the SSA 
for 833 Agriprocessors employees suspected of using invalid social 
security numbers or social security numbers belonging to other real 
people. These 833 employees were all reported as having earned wages 
while working at Agriprocessors during the third quarter of 2007. All 833 
employees were found to have either used invalid social security numbers 
or social security numbers assigned to names of other people. 
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82. On February 28, 2008, ICE agents received additional social security "no 
match" information from the SSA for an additional 22 Agriprocessors 
employees suspected of using invalid social security numbers or social 
security numbers belonging to other real people. These 22 employees 
were all reported as having earned wages while working at Agriprocessors 
during the fourth quarter of 2007. All22 employees were reported by SSA 
to either have used invalid social security numbers or social security 
numbers assigned to names of other people. 
83. Based on the "no match" information received from the SSA for social 
security numbers used by Agriprocessors employees during the third and 
fourth quarters of 2007, about 737 current Agriprocessors employees are 
believed to be using a social security number not lawfully issued to that 
person. Due to the turnover in the Agriprocessors work force, the exact 
number of employees varies somewhat from quarter to quarter. The 737 
fourth-quarter employees include about 147 using social security numbers 
confirmed by the SSA as being invalid social security numbers (never 
issued to a person) and about 590 using valid social security numbers, 
however the numbers did not match the name of the employee reported 
by Agriprocessors as having used that number during employment. 
OTHER EVIDENCE 
84. ICE agents used the Accurint database to further research the validity of 
the social security numbers used by Agriprocessors employees. Accurint 
is a web-based application tool available to law enforcement personnel for 
the purpose of searching for identity information, address location, 
financial records, property information, business listings, employment 
records, phone information, and other identifying information. Accurint 
uses a proprietary data-linking technology to gather the search results via 
more than 100,000 different public records and non-public information 
sources to aid in fraud detection and identity solutions. This includes such 
sources as Department of Motor Vehicles, County Assessor's Office, and 
private credit' reporting entities. For example, if a social security number is 
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placed in the appropriate block of the search information that is queried 
for a person, then a name, or a list of names, for the person or persons 
who have previously used that social security number, and their address 
and telephone number (if available), will be shown. If there is no name 
associated with that social security card, or if that person is known to be 
deceased, then that will be reflected as well. 
85. A request from ICE Special Agents to the IWD for an Employer's 
Contribution and Payroll Report Form 65-5300 (hereinafter "Payroll 
Report") for the 2nd Quarter of 2007 (April, May, and June of 2007) for 
Agriprocessors revealed there were 1 , 116 employees reflected as 
receiving wages for that time period. A search was conducted by ICE 
agents in the Accurint database for the individual social security numbers 
listed in the 2nd Quarter 2007 Payroll Report. This search revealed that 
approximately 878 out of 1,116 (78.6%) of the social security numbers 
input into Accurint either did not appear to be associated with the person 
assigned to that social security number or the number did not reveal any 
person associated with that number. This analysis would not account for 
the possibility that a person may have falsely used the identity of an actual 
person's name and Social Security Number. In my training and expertise, 
I kn.ow it is not uncommon for aliens to purchase identity documents which 
include Social Security Numbers that match the name assigned to the 
number. 
86. ICE Special Agents conducted a search by social security number of the 
Federal Trade Commission's (hereinafter "FTC") Consumer Sentinel 
Network database that is used for reporting incidents of identity theft. The 
search revealed that a person who was assigned one of the social 
security numbers being used by an employee of Agriprocessors has 
reported his/her identity being stolen. 
87. A request from ICE Special Agents to the IWD for a Payroll Report for the 
3rd Quarter of 2007 (July, August, and September of 2007) for 
Agriprocessors revealed there were 1,063 employees reflected as 
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receiving wages for that time period. A search was conducted by ICE 
agents in the Accurint database for the 1 09 new employees whose 
additional social security numbers were listed in the 3rd Quarter 2007 
Payroll Report. This search revealed that approximately 83 out of 1 09 
(76%) of the social security numbers input into Accurint either did not 
appear to be associated with the person assigned to that social security 
number or the number did not reveal any person associated with that 
number. The previous 2"d quarter IWD Payroll Report of persons who 
had left employment showed that, based on the previous Accurint queries, 
126 out of 162 (77%) had what appeared to be discrepancies. This left a 
total of 835 of the current 1063 employees (78.5%) as having 
discrepancies based on Accurint checks. A search by social security 
number of the 1 09 new employees was conducted in the FTC's Consumer 
Sentinel Network database did not reveal any person reporting his/her 
identity as being fraudulently used by an unknown party. 
88. On February 20, 2008, ICE Special Agents in Cedar Rapids received a 
copy of the 2007 fourth quarter Payroll Report for Agriprocessors from 
IWD. The fourth quarter payroll report reflects the names and social 
security numbers reported by the company for employees who earned 
wages during the months of October, November, and December of 2007. 
A review of this report revealed that the company reported paying wages 
to a total of 968 employees during the fourth quarter of 2007. An analysis 
of the report by ICE agents showed that 52 new employees at 
Agriprocessors were paid during the fourth quarter that were not recorded 
as having been paid on the Payroll Report for the third quarter of 2007. 
Accurint law enforcement record checks revealed that approximately 22 of 
the 52 (42%) newly reported social security numbers used by employees 
of Agriprocessors either related to a real person's name that did not 
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match the name listed on the payroll report, or the Accurint checks did not 
reveal any information relating to that social security number. Based on a 
comparison of the third and fourth quarter payroll reports for 
--- - ---------·---- . . 
Agriprocessors, and the Accurint law enforcement record checks, it 
appears that approximately 99 of the 148 (67%) employees who were 
reported on the 2007 third quarter report, but not reflected on the 2007 
fourth quarter report, had social security number discrepancies. Thus, 
according to the reviews of the third and fourth quarter payroll reports 
combined, approximately 737 of the fourth quarter employees reported by 
Agriprocessors appear to have social security number discrepancies. 
89. A comparison was made of the May 5, 2006, EDCOR letter sent from 
SSA to Agriprocessors to the combined "no match" information from 
February 20, 2008, and February 28, 2008, that was received from SSA 
and derived from both the third and fourth quarter Agriprocessors Payroll 
Reports. This analysis revealed that approximately 141 of the social 
security numbers were shown as still being actively used by employees at 
Agriprocessors. 
SUMMARY OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION 
90. It appears that based on: 
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a. The apprehensions in the years of 2004 through 2007 by ICE 
Special Agents of known criminal offenders, the majority of whom 
were later prosecuted in federal district court for their use of 
fraudulent documents, and who have stated that their employer 
was Agriprocessors; 
b. The EDCOR correspondence that shows that Agriprocessors has 
repeatedly been made aware that large numbers of its employees 
were using social security numbers that have discrepancies for 
each tax year from 2000 to 2005; 
c. The indices checks conducted by ICE employees in commercial 
and government databases, and the IWD Payroll Reports for 2007, 
reflect discrepancies between the name attributed to each social 
security number in those databases and the working name and the 
social security number used for employment at Agriprocessors; 
and, 
-------------------------- -- _,__ -
d. Based on information thus far developed in this investigation, it 
appears, based on 2007 fourth quarter payroll reports, that 
approximately 76% of the 968 employees of Agriprocessors were 
using false or fraudulent social security numbers in connection with 
their employment, 
That there is probable cause to believe that (a large percentage 
approximately 76% as of the 41h Quarter 2007) of the total workforce 
reported to IWD, nearly all of which appear to be Agriprocessors floor 
workers, used fraudulent documents or documents with social security or 
other identification numbers that were lawfully issued to others, or not 
issued at all, and are currently employed unlawfully by Agriprocessors. In 
addition, there is probable cause to believe there may be some 
Agriprocessors employees paid in cash who are not reported to IWD, and 
who are currently employed illegally without valid documents. 
HARBORING RELATED TO VEHICLE TITLE AND REGISTRATION FRAUD 
91. The United States Postal Inspection Service ("USPIS"), the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), and the Iowa Department of 
Transportation ("DOT") have investigated possible document fraud 
involving the titles and registration of vehicles used by employees of 
Agriprocessors. The following is based on information provided to your 
affiant by these agencies. 
92. In September 2005, the DOT began investigating reports of questionable 
title transactions between Des Moines and Allamakee Counties. 
Burlington is the County Seat for Des Moines County and Postville is 
located in Allamakee County. The suspect applicants showed addresses 
in Burlington, Iowa, but registration renewals were repeatedly made in 
Allamakee County. 
93. A DOT Investigator who spent time in the Postville area noted a high 
number of license plates from Des Moines County. From time to time, the 
Investigator had involvement with vehicles in the Postville area during 
traffic stops made while working formerly as a Postville Reserve Police 
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Officer. The DOT Investigator also reviewed vehicle title transactions as a 
DOT Investigator. The majority of the vehicles showed Des Moines 
County addresses on the registration and title information despite the 
vehicles consistently remaining in Postville, even after ownership 
changed. The Agriprocessors facility contains a parking lot for 
employees. By driving into Postville and going through the parking lot at 
Agriprocessors, the DOT tnvestigator was able to determine that a large 
number of the vehicles in question appeared to be driven by employees of 
Agriprocessors and parked in the company parking lot during the 
employees' shifts. 
94. The DOT Investigator was aware that a supervisor at Agriprocessors was 
connected with the sales of vehicles. On at least one occasion, the 
supervisor had retrieved or attempted to retrieve vehicles from 
impoundment at the Postville Police Department on behalf of another 
Agriprocessors employee. A number of the vehicles appeared to have a 
link to a car dealership located in Cedar Rapids, Iowa ("Dealership"). 
95. In October 2005, DOT Investigators audited the Dealership. The 
managers of the Dealership stated that the Agriprocessors' supervi~or 
("C") was a personal friend of theirs. They stated they had been selling a 
large volume of cars through the Agriprocessors' supervisor to people in 
the Postville area. The Dealership managers had supplied vehicles 
directly to the Agriprocessors supervisor for resale in Postville, in violation 
of Iowa law, which requires all vehicle dealers be licensed. In the year 
2005, more than 50 vehicles were sold to people in the Postville area. 
According to the DOT Investigator, sales to Postville residents appeared 
to represent approximately 90% of the business for the Dealership. In 
many cases, the dealership's files contained copies of the ultimate 
purchaser's resident alien or social security card and other identification 
information. 
96. According to the Dealership managers, pursuant to the arrangement "C" 
had with the Dealership, "C" supervisor would contact the Dealership and 
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indicate the need for a specific type of vehicle. The Dealership would 
then purchase the vehicle at auction. The Agriprocessors supervisor 
would pick up the vehicle in Cedar Rapids and pay for the vehicle at that 
time. The Dealership managers did not know the price the Agriprocessors 
supervisor charged the customers in Postville. 
97. Though the vehicles were sold to people in Postville, they were being 
titled in Des Moines County, Chickasaw County, and a few other counties. 
The information provided to the county treasurers was often different 
from the information contained in the Dealership records. A Special 
Agent with the Office of Inspector General, Social Security Administration, 
confirmed that the majority of the social security numbers used on 
applications for registration of vehicles did not belong to the person using 
the number. 
98. The DOT Investigator was told, by unconfirmed sources, that the 
Agriprocessors supervisor forced Agriprocessors employees to purchase 
vehicles from him or they would be fired or given poor work shifts. 
According to an unconfirmed source, a former Clayton County Deputy 
Sheriff said the Agriprocessors' supervisor told the former deputy that the 
Agriprocessors' supervisor had $80,000 of his personal money loaned out 
to Agriprocessors employees in connection with selling them vehicles. 
99. In the fall of 2005, the DOT investigator attempted to speak with several 
of the purchasers of the vehicles. When he attempted to do so at the 
Agriprocessors plant, he discovered that the Agriprocessors supervisor 
("C") had personally escorted the employee to the office for the interview 
with the DOT Investigator and waited outside the room during the 
interviews. When the DOT Investigator decided to terminate the attempt 
to interview employees at the plant, the Agriprocessors supervisor 
confronted the Investigator and appeared visibly angry about the 
investigation. 
100. A short time later, the Investigator contacted an Agriprocessors' 
employee, Source #13, off site of the plant, and interviewed him/her about 
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the purchase of a vehicle from the Agriprocessors' supervisor. A few days 
after this interview, Source #13 filed a complaint with the Postville Police 
Department, asserting that the Agriprocessors' supervisor had threatened 
Source #13 about being interviewed by the DOT Investigator. Source #13 
reported that the Agriprocessors supervisor threatened to harm Source 
#13 and also fired him/her. 
101. The DOT Investigator learned from talking with Des Moines County 
Treasurer's Office personnel that a person hereafter referred to as Source 
#14 was involved in making applications to title and register cars in Des 
Moines County on behalf of people living in Postville. In the fall of 2005, 
the DOT Investigator interviewed Source #14 at the Des Moines County 
Treasurer's Office. Having been advised of and waiving his Constitutional 
rights, Source #14 stated that s/he would receive the application 
information or vehicle title information from two people in Postville, one 
hereafter referred to as Subject 1 (an Agriprocessors' employee) or 
another Subject Z. Source #14 received the documents (application 
information or title information for the transfer) via the mail, along with 
money. Source #14 then applied at the Des Moines County Treasurer's 
Office for the registration and title on behalf of the owner, using one of 
several addresses in the Burlington or West Burlington area. Source #14 
advised her/his friends living at those addresses to expect to receive the 
registrations and titles in the mail. Source #14 arranged to pick the 
documents up from her/his friends and then sent them to Postville in bulk 
to be provided to the vehicle owner. Source #14 reported doing th is more 
than 200 times, and s/he received a small fee each time. 
1 02. On October 3, 2006, FBI and ICE Special Agents interviewed Source #15, 
a citizen of Guatemala. Source #15 stated s/he began work at 
Agriprocessors in October 2004, gaining employment by providing 
fraudulent social security and resident alien cards to the company. 
Source #15 began work in the turkey kill part of the Agriprocessors facility. 
Source #15 described the work as very difficult and that it hurt Source 
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#15's hands, so Source #15 requested a transfer to another area of the 
plant. Source #15's request was turned down by the Agriprocessors 
supervisor. Other Agriprocessors employees told Source #15 that, in 
order to get a favorable position in the plant, Source #15 would have to 
purchase a car from the supervisor. In January 2006, the supervisor 
approached Source #15 and offered to sell him/her a car, but Source #15 
declined. When Source #15 asked for a transfer, the supervisor refused. 
103. Your affiant knows, based on his training and experience, that 
undocumented aliens sometimes title vehicles in false identities using 
fraudulent documents and using false or fraudulent addresses to avoid 
detection by law enforcement and immigration authorities. 
EXPLOITATION OF ILLEGAL ALIENS AS INDICIA OF HARBORING 
104. Your Affiant is aware, from his training and experience, that those who 
employ illegal aliens often exploit the aliens in various ways. Those who 
knowingly employ or supervise illegal aliens, knowing their unlawful status, 
are able to exploit illegal aliens because illegal aliens are unlikely to 
contact authorities for fear they will be arrested and/or deported. 
Exploitation can take on many forms, such as requiring employees to 
provide money or other things of value to maintain employment or secure 
better working hours or tasks, providing sub-par working conditions, failing 
to pay overtime, and physically harassing or mistreating employees. 
105. In this case, as outlined in paragraphs 86 through 98 above, there is 
probable cause to believe an Agriprocessors supervisor has assisted, for 
a cut of the proceeds, illegal aliens in obtaining false documentation in 
relation to purchasing vehicles, and thereby has aided in harboring the 
illegal aliens. The supervisor has also required illegal aliens to purchase 
vehicles through the supervisor in an attempt to secure better working 
conditions, as indicated by Source #15. 
106. As further evidence of harboring illegal aliens through exploiting their 
reluctance to contact the authorities, your Affiant is aware that the Iowa 
Department of Labor has uncovered workplace safety problems at 
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Agriprocessors. On March 21, 2008 the Cedar Rapids Gazette reported 
that the Division of Labor Services for the State of Iowa issued to 
Agriprocessors 39 citations with proposed penalties of $182,000 for 
allegedly violating state workplace safety and health standards. According 
to the article, a health inspection done on February 11, 2008, identified 13 
serious health violations. On October 31, 2007, an inspection by the 
Division of Labor Services resulted in 26 citations, including two repeat 
violations. 
107. On April1, 2008, during testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, Agriprocessors was among three 
packing plants cited for having a history of safety violations. According to 
the testimony, during the period of April 2001 to February 2006, OSHA 
records show no less than twenty violations at AgriProcessors' Postville 
plant. Of these, twelve were identified by OSHA as serious. An 
examination of Agriprocessor's Postville plant's "OSHA 300" logs revealed 
five amputations along with dozens of other serious injuries such as 
broken bones, eye injuries and hearing loss. The witness also testified 
that there is concern that injuries are often unreported or under-reported. 
The witness also cited numerous reports in the media regarding workers' 
mistreatment at Agriprocessors, including a 2006 article "In Iowa Meat 
Plant, Kosher 'Jungle' Breeds Fear, Injury, Short Pay," published in a 
newspaper The Forward. 
108. Following an article in The Forward, the Washington Post reported on July 
7, 2007, that some conservative rabbis who toured the plant were 
shocked. " We found people arriving from the mountainsides of 
Guatemala on a Tuesday and being on the front of the production line on 
Wednesday . . . . We saw people who could barely read Spanish getting 
training in English and having no idea what was said to them." 
1 09. On March 27, 2007, over twenty current and former employees filed a civil 
suit in the U.S. Court for the Northern District of Iowa against 
Agriprocessors, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The 
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lawsuit alleged that Agriprocessors failed to pay workers for time spend 
preparing for and cleaning up after work. Seven of those plaintiffs are 
included among the employees listed on the third and fourth quarter of 
2007 IWD reports as working for Agriprocessors using social security 
numbers which did not match the names to which they were assigned, or 
that were unassigned to any person. The lawsuit was settled out of court. 
REQUEST TO SEARCH FOR AND IDENTIFY ALL SUBJECTS OF CRIMINAL 
COMPLAINTS 
110. On April 16, 2008, the United States filed criminal complaints against 697 
45 
current Agriprocessors employees under their alias names, charging them 
with unlawfully using social security numbers in relation to their 
employment in violation of Title 42, United States Code, Sections 
408(a)(7)(B); aggravated identity theft in violation of Title 18, United 
States Code, Section 1 028A(a)(1 ); and/or possession or use of false 
identity documents for purposes of employment in violation of Title 18, 
United States Code, Section 1546. Three of those subjects have 
subsequently been encountered and arrested by local authorities on 
unrelated criminal charges. Because the true identities of the 697 
subjects was unknown at the time, (and with the exception of three people 
remain unknown today) the court issued "John Doe" arrest warrants which 
describe the subject by the name under which the su~ject is employed at 
Agriprocessors. Each of these subjects was listed on the fourth-quarter 
payroll records obtained from IWD. (Though ICE has requested payroll 
records from IWD for the first quarter of 2008, IWD has advised that 
Agriprocessors has not yet reported that information to IWD.) There is 
probable cause to believe one or more of those subjects are present at 
Agriprocessors during regular working hours. This Search Warrant 
Application seeks authorization to search the Agriprocessors plant and 
curtilage for and identify any of those 697 employees for whom the United 
States obtained a criminal complaint. 
REQUEST TO SEARCH FOR AND SEIZE IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS 
FROM PERSONS 
111. As explained in the prior section, the government filed criminal complaints 
against 697 employees of Agriprocessors who were reportedly working 
there under aliases. With the exception of approximately 15 of those 
people for whom the government has photographs, (and the three who 
have recently been encountered by local authorities) the government 
cannot positively identify the other people who are subject to the arrest 
warrants due to their suspected use of assumed names and/or Social 
Security numbers or other means of identification. Moreover, determining 
the identities of all employees at the Agriprocessors's facility, including a 
determination of their lawful status (whether a United States citizen, lawful 
permanent resident alien, an alien eligible for employment, or an illegal 
alien) and what percentage of the workforce is illegally in the United 
States and employed at Agriprocessors, constitutes potential evidence of 
violations of law, including possible harboring of aliens by Agriprocessors 
and/or its management and supervisors. In other words, in harboring 
cases, the percentage of the workforce that is working legally, versus the 
percentage of the workforce that is working illegally, constitutes evidence 
of harboring admissible at a criminal trial against those accused of 
harboring the illegal aliens. Based on the facts set forth in this Affidavit, 
there is probable cause to believe that Agriprocessors' employees 
possess, either on their persons or in lockers or similar storage areas at 
the facility, company-issued identification cards, drivers' licenses and 
other forms of identification. (As part of this investigation, ICE Special 
Agents have confirmed from an Iowa DOT database that Iowa drivers 
licenses have been issued to many of the employees for whom ICE has 
"no-match" social security information.) Furthermore, false or fictitious 
immigration documents, social security cards, and similar fraudulent 
identification documents constitute contraband, the possession of which is 
itself illegal. Your affiant also knows from his training and experience that 
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illegal aliens often attempt to dispose of or discard identification 
documents during an immigration raid either at the instruction of their 
employer or based on their own volition. Management or supervisory 
personnel may sometimes pick up or collect these discarded identification 
documents in an effort to conceal the harboring of the illegal aliens. The 
agents intend to engage in consensual conversations with employees 
concerning their identification, and to request voluntary production of 
identification documents. This Search Warrant Application seeks 
authorization to, if necessary, search for and seize from each person 
believed to be an employee of Agriprocessors any and all Agriprocessors-
issued identification cards, Agriprocessors-issued entry or proximity cards, 
drivers' licenses, or other means of identification from any person or any 
location within the Agriprocessors facility. 
REQUEST TO SEARCH AND SEIZE BIOMETRIC INFORMATION 
112. As stated in the previous paragraph, determination of the identities of all 
employees at the Agriprocessors's facility, including a determination of 
their lawful status (whether a United States citizen, lawful permanent 
resident alien, an alien eligible for employment, or an illegal alien) and 
what percentage of the workforce is illegally in the United States and 
employed at Agriprocessors, may constitute evidence of violations of law, 
including possible harboring of aliens by Agriprocessors and/or its 
management and supervisors. Moreover, Agriprocessors uses swipe 
cards and/or biometric devices to identify employees and as a form of 
time clock, registering the hours of employment. There is probable cause 
to believe that having employees place their hand on the biometric device 
used in the plant on the day of the search will reveal evidence of the 
identity of the employee and provide further evidence as to hours of work. 
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Having the employees "clock out" using the biometric devices on the day 
of the search will, incidentally, aid in ensuring the employees are paid for 
any time they worked on the day of the search. This Search Warrant 
Application seeks authorization to search for and seize biometric 
information using Agriprocessors' biometric identification system. This will 
be accomplished by having employees "clock oue by either placing their 
hand on the biometric device and/or using the swipe cards issued to 
employees as necessary to disclose the identity evidence contained in the 
system. This Search Warrant Application also seeks authorization to 
search for and seize from Agriprocessors any electronic or computer 
hardware, software, or storage devices utilized by the company in 
connection with the biometric identification system, as set forth below in 
more detail. 
REQUEST TO SEARCH FOR AND SEIZE ALL DES MOINES COUNTY 
VEHICLE TITLE AND REGISTRATION INFORMATION 
113. One or more Agriprocessors supervisory employees are involved in 
harboring, or aiding and abetting the harboring, of illegal aliens by 
assisting them to obtain titles and registrations for vehicles in their false 
names, and by arranging to have the vehicles titled and registered with 
false addresses in Des Moines County. This false information on the titles 
and registration documents aids illegal aliens in avoiding detection at their 
actual place of residence and in their use of false means of identification. 
There is probable cause to believe that vehicles bearing Des Moines 
County license plates located at the Agriprocessors' facility would contain 
title and registration information that would constitute evidence of this 
harboring activity and vehicle registration fraud. This Search Warrant 
Application seeks authorization to search all vehicles on the 
Agriprocessors property bearing license plates from Des Moines County 
for titles and registration documentation and any other evidence of the 
owner or use of the vehicle. 
REQUEST TO SEARCH AND SEIZE COMPUTER SYSTEM 
114. The foregoing establishes probable cause to believe that evidence of 
criminal activity is stored on the premises in the form of computer data. 
Computer hardware, software, and electronic files on the premises 
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therefore may be important to this criminal investigation because they 
may be used as storage devices that contain contraband, evidence, 
instrumentalities, or fruits of crime in the form of electronic data. Rule 41 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the government to 
search for and seize computer hardware, software, and electronic files 
that are evidence of crime, contraband, instrumentalities of crime, and/or 
fruits of crime. In this case, the warrant application requests permission to 
search and seize all records described in Attachment #2, including 
records that happen to be stored in electronic form. These records 
constitute evidence of crime. This application also requests permission to 
seize the computer hardware that may contain those electronic records if 
it becomes necessary for reasons of practicality to remove the hardware 
and conduct a search off-site. 
115. Based upon my training, experience, and consultations with ICE 
Computer Forensic Agent(s), I know that information stored in an 
electronic format may be found not only on the hard disk drive of a 
computer, but on other computer hardware and storage media, including 
back-up tapes, diskettes, CO-ROMs, handheld organizers, and other 
devices capable of storing information in an electronic format. I also know 
that during the search of the premises it is not always possible to search 
computer hardware and storage media for data for a number of reasons, 
including the following: 
49 
(A) The volume of evidence: The volume of data stored on many 
computer systems and storage devices will typically be so large that it will 
be highly impractical to search for data during the execution of the 
physical search of the premises. Computer storage devices like hard 
disks, tapes, CO-ROM's, and Digital Video Disks (DVD's), can store the 
equivalent of thousands of pages of information. A single megabyte of 
storage space is equivalent to 500 double-spaced pages of text. A single 
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gigabyte of storage space, or 1,000 megabytes, is equivalent to 500,000 
double-spaced pages of text. Storage devices capable of storing 160 
gigabytes of data are now commonplace in desktop computers. 
Consequently, each non-networked, desktop computer found during a 
search can easily contain the equivalent of 80 million pages of date, 
which, if printed out, would result in a stack of paper over four miles high. 
(B) Technical requirements: Searching computer systems is a 
highly technical process that requires specific expertise and specialized · 
equipment. There are so many types of computer hardware and software 
in use today that it is impossible to bring to the search site all of the 
necessary technical manuals and specialized equipment necessary to 
conduct a thorough search. In addition, it may be necessary to consult 
with computer personnel who have specific expertise in the type of 
computer, software application, or operating system that is being 
searched. 
(C) Files may be hidden or encrypted: Computer users can attempt 
to conceal data within computer equipment and storage devices through a 
number of methods, including the use of innocuous or misleading 
filenames and extensions. For example, files with the extension ".txt." 
often are text files; however, a user can easily change the extension to 
"jpg." to conceal the text file and make it appear that the file on contains 
an image. Computer users can also attempt to conceal data by using 
encryption, which means that a password or device , such as a "dongle" or 
"keycard, " is necessary to decrypt the data into readable form. Therefore, 
a substantial amount of time is necessary to extract and sort through data 
that is concealed or encrypted to determine whether it is evidence, 
contraband, or instrumentalities of a crime. The forensic procedures used 
to recover hidden, compressed , password-protected or encrypted files can 
be extremely time consuming, even for a qualified expert. In fact, if robust 
encryption software is utilized to encrypt a file and the password is 
unknown, it may be impossible to decrypt the file in order to view the 
information contained within it. Files encrypted with less secure 
encryption algorithms may still require considerable time or outside 
agency assistance to decrypt, absent a password. 
(D) Danger of the Destruction of Evidence: Computer evidence is 
extremely vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional modification or 
destruction, both from external sources and from destructive code 
embedded in the system as a "booby trap." In order to maintain the 
integrity of the original evidence, a qualified expert may need to conduct a 
forensic examination of the storage media in a controlled environment, 
such as a law enforcement laboratory, where scientific procedures and 
specialized software designed to protect the integrity of the original media 
will be used. 
116. ICE Computer Forensic Agent(s) have also advised me that in order to 
retrieve electronically stored evidence from a seized computer, agents 
may be required to seize most or all of a computer system's equipment, 
including hardware, peripherals, software, documentation, security 
devices, and passwords. This is true because of the following: 
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(A) Some operating systems, software or hardware configurations 
require the original equipment and/or installed software to be present in 
order to access the information contained on the system. 
(B) Peripheral devices that allow users to enter or retrieve data 
from the storage devices vary in their compatibility with other hardware 
and software. 
(C) The Computer Forensic Agent may have to install software 
used by the suspect on a government computer in order to retrieve 
information the suspect may have stored using that software. The CFA 
may need to refer to software and hardware documentation maintained by 
the suspect to complete his/her analysis iri a timely manner. The 
suspect's computer documentation may also contain hand-written notes 
specific to the seized computer system. 
(D) Physical keys, encryption devices, dongles, and similar physical 
items may be necessary to gain access to the computer equipment. 
Passwords, pass-phrases, password files, and similar decryption codes 
may be required to access specific information stored on the seized 
computer system. 
117. Therefore, it is requested that agents executing this search warrant be 
authorized to employ the following procedure upon execution of this 
search warrant: 
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(A) After the premises have been secured, an ICE Computer 
Forensic Agent and/or other law enforcement personnel trained in 
searching and seizing computer data (the "computer personnel") will make 
an initial review of any computer hardware and storage media to 
determine if it is possible to search these items on-site in a reasonable 
amount of time and without jeopardizing the ability to preserve the data. If 
for some unforeseen circumstances, the computer personnel are not 
present during the execution of the search warrant, then all hardware, 
storage media, peripherals, software, documentation, security devices, 
and passwords, as defined below, will be seized and transported to an 
appropriate law enforcement facility for review. The hardware and 
storage media will be reviewed by appropriately trained personnel in order 
to extract and seize any data that falls within the list of items to be seized, 
as set forth in Attachment B. 
(B) If the computer hardware and storage media cannot be 
searched on-site, then the computer personnel will determine whether it is 
practical to copy the data during the execution of the search in a 
reasonable amount of time without jeopardizing the ability to preserve the 
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data. The computer personnel will also determine if these backups will be 
useable for an off-site examination conducted at a later date without the 
original equipment. As stated above, some operating systems, software 
or hardware configurations require the original equipment and/or installed 
software to be present in order to access the information contained on the 
system. 
(C) If the computer personnel determine it is not practical to 
perform an on-site search or make an on-site copy of the data, then all 
hardware, storage media, peripherals, software, documentation, security 
devices, and passwords, as defined below, will be seized and transported 
to an appropriate law enforcement facility for review. The hardware and 
storage media will be reviewed by appropriately trained personnel in order 
to extract and seize any data that falls within the list of items to be seized, 
as set forth in Attachment B. 
(D) If law enforcement personnel determine, either on-site or during 
a subsequent off-site search, that any hardware, storage media, 
peripheral, software, security device, or data (1) is an instrumentality of 
the offense stated above, meaning that it was designed or intended for 
the use of, or is being or has been used, as the means of committing the 
offense; (2) contains any contraband, such as counterfeit or stolen 
software, child pornography, national security information, or unauthorized 
access devices such as stolen credit card numbers; (3) is the fruits of 
criminal activity; or (4) is otherwise criminally possessed, the property 
shall be seized and not returned pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41(b). 
(E) Any data that is encrypted and unreadable will not be returned 
unless law enforcement personnel have determined that the data is not 
(1) an instrumentality of the offense, (2) a fruit of the criminal activity, (3) 
contraband, (4) otherwise unlawfully possessed, or (5) evidence of the 
offense specified above. 
. . • ~ s ~ . . • 
(F) In searching the data, the computer personnel may examine 
and copy all of the data contained in the computer equipment and storage 
devices to view their precise contents and determine whether the data 
falls within the items to be seized, as set forth in Attachment B. In 
addition, the computer personnel may search for and attempt to recover 
de'Jeted, hidden, or encrypted data to determine whether the data falls 
within the list of items to be seized. 
(G) All hardware, storage media, peripherals, software, 
documentation, security devices, and passwords that were seized for off-
site examination, and are not otherwise subject to seizure, shall be 
returned by the government to the subject premises within a reasonable 
period of time. 
118. For purposes of this affidavit, the foregoing terms are defined as follows: 
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(A) Hardware: Hardware includes the following equipment: (1) 
data-processing devices containing central processing units, such as 
"desktop", "tower", "laptop" and "notebook" computers, hand-held 
electronic organizers, and "personal digital assistants"; (2) internal and 
external storage devices, including magnetic storage devices such as 
hard disk drives, diskette drives, and tape drives, optical storage devices 
such as CD-ROM drives, CD-R/CD-RW recorders, and DVD 
drives/recorders, and other memory storage devices such as smart-card 
readers. 
(B) Storage Media: Storage media includes any material capable of 
storing information in a manner that can be used by computer hardware to 
save and/or retrieve information. Examples of storage media include 
diskettes, CD-ROM's, CD-R's, CD-RW's, DVD's, DVD-R's, DVD-RW's, 
magnetic tapes, ZIP disks, JAZ disks, Peerless disks, SparQ disks, ORB 
disks, optical disks, smart-cards, EPROMS, and digital memory media 
such as CompactFiash, SmartMedia, Sony Memory Sticks, and USB 
"thumb" or "key" drives. 
(C) Peripherals: Peripherals are equipment that send data to, or 
receive data from, computer hardware, but do not normally store user 
data. Keyboards, mice, printers, scanners, plotters, video display 
monitors, modems, cables, and certain types of facsimile machines are 
examples of peripherals. 
(D) Software: Software is digital information that can be interpreted 
by computer hardware to direct the way hardware works. Software is 
stored in electronic, magnetic, optical, or other digital form. It commonly 
includes programs to run operating systems (like Microsoft "Windows"), 
applications (like word-processing, graphics, or spreadsheet programs), 
utilities, and communications programs. 
(E) Documentation: Computer-related documentation consists of 
written, recorded, printed, or electronically stored material which explains 
or illustrates how to configure or use computer hardware, software, or 
other related items. 
(F) Securitv Devices: Security devices include physical keys, 
encryption devices, "dongles", and similar physical items needed to gain 
access to associated computer hardware. 
(G) Passwords: Passwords include alphanumeric strings, pass-
phrases, password files, and similar decryption codes necessary to 
access data that is encrypted or otherwise inaccessible. 
119. No wire communications or electronic communications shall be 
intercepted during the execution of this search warrant. I have no 
information to indicate that the computer(s) to be searched operate in any 
way as an Internet Web Site Host/Server, Internet File Transfer Protocol 
(FTP) server, Internet Chat Server, or Internet Email forwarder or server. 
As such, it would appear that the provisions of the Wire and Electronic 
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Communications lnterceptio!l Act, 18 U.S.C. S 2510 et seq. do not apply. 
Should information of this type be discovered, the government will 
preserve it and set it aside. 
120. I have no information to indicate that any "work product" or "documentary" 
materials are stored on the computer(s) to be searched, for the purpose of 
disseminating it to a public newspaper, broadcast, or other similar form of 
public communication. Should agents become aware of any such 
materials as described in 42 U.S.C. S 2000aa, they shall be returned as 
quickly as circumstances permit. 
CONCLUSION 
121. Based on the above information, there is probable cause to believe that 
evidence of the crimes of harboring illegal aliens in violation of Title 8, 
United States Code, Sections 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), 1324(a)(1 )(A)(iv), 
1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(ll), and 1324(a)(1)(8)(1); engaging in a pattern or practice 
of hiring and continuing to employ undocumented aliens in violation of 
Title 8, United States Code, Sections 1324a(a)(1 )(A), 1324a(a)(2) and 
1324a(f)(1 ); document fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, 
Section 1546(b ), misuse of a social security number in violation of Title 
42, United States Code, Section 408(a)(7)(B); and aggravated identity 
theft in violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section 1028A(a)(1); will 
be found on the property described in Attachment 1. 
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122. The items and/or persons to be searched for, identified, and/or seized are 
set out in Attachment 2. The United States requests an order sealing this 
application and search warrant until entry is made on the premises to 
execute the search warrant, except with respect that portion of 
Attachment 2 which lists the names of the 695 people for whom there are 
criminal complaints. The United States requests those names remain 
sealed until further order of this Court because the criminal complaints 
have been already been ordered sealed until further order of this Court, 
and the names may also be victims of identity theft. 
Further your affiant sayeth not.,---... 
~~~~/~ 
David M. Hoagland, Senior Special Agent 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
;J, 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this _1_ day of May, 2008. 
JON~LES 
Magistrate Judge 
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